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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that slavery was a violation of the Takings
Clause of the United States Constitution. Slaves, like all people,
possessed a property right of self-ownership. When the government
appropriated that property, through laws establishing slavery, the
rightful owners of the property—the slaves—suffered uncompensated
physical, regulatory, and derivative takings. Victims of slavery, like
victims of other impermissible takings, are constitutionally entitled to
just compensation under the Takings Clause. This Article concludes
by examining some potential judicial and legislative consequences of
treating slavery as a Takings Clause violation.
1
The history of Blacks in America is inextricably intertwined with
the institution of slavery. Slavery existed in the colonies for over a
1. Throughout this Article I will use the term “Black” rather than “black” or
“African-American.” Cf. Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1332 n.2 (1988) (“I shall use ‘African-American’ and ‘Black’ interchangeably. When
using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians,
Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a specific cultural group and, as such,
require denotation as a proper noun.”).
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century, and for an additional century in the United States. After its
abolition, slavery was replaced by a network of racially oppressive laws
and legally supported segregation, which allowed and facilitated the
3
infliction of further indignity upon Blacks.
Since the abolition of slavery, former slaves have sought
4
compensation for the harms they suffered. Modern scholars and
advocates have argued in increasing numbers that descendants of
5
slaves should receive reparations.
Politicians have proposed
2. See AFRICANAONLINE, SLAVERY TIMELINE (providing a comprehensive timeline
of the history of the institution of slavery and Black history), at
http://www.africanaonline.com/slavery_timeline.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
3. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 21-80, 155-90, 571-606
(4th ed. 2000); Joe R. Feagin & Eileen O’Brien, The Long Overdue Reparations for
African Americans, in WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH 417, 418-19 (Roy L. Brooks ed.,
1999).
4. Attempts to secure compensation began immediately following
emancipation. See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS
240-41 (1999) (giving an example of a letter from a former slave asking for
compensation from his former slaveowner and discussing how slaveowners “stole”
labor and “robbed the future” of slave descendents); Does America Owe a Debt to the
Descendants of Its Slaves?, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2000, reprinted in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?:
SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 79, 101-02 (Raymond A. Winbush
ed., 2003) [hereinafter SHOULD AMERICA PAY?] (citing a letter from a freed slave to
his master asking for back wages); id. at 102-03 (providing timeline of reparations
attempts); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-77 68-70, 158-61 (1988) (discussing attempts by the Freedman’s Bureau to
secure reparations); Alfred L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in
Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 498-99 (2002) (discussing
congressional proposals to redistribute property to freed slaves after the Civil War);
F. Michael Higginbotham, A Dream Revived: The Rise of the Black Reparations Movement,
58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447, 450 (2002) (noting that while support for
reparations began during the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson vetoed
reparations bills). Among these early reparation attempts were Sherman’s proposed
“forty acres and a mule,” the Southern Homestead Act passed in 1866, further
proposed legislation in 1867, and a $68 million reparations suit filed in 1915. See
infra notes 247-248 (discussing the “forty acres and a mule” proposal). For a
discussion of these early attempts, see ROBINSON, supra, at 206-07, and SHOULD
AMERICA PAY?, supra, at 103.
5. One of the first modern legal scholars to argue for reparations was Professor
Boris Bittker of the Yale University Law School. Professor Bittker, long ambivalent
about the concept of slave reparations, wrote his groundbreaking book after his
reparations research convinced him that it wasn’t a “crazy, far-fetched idea.” See
BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (Beacon Press 2003) (1973).
Several recent law review articles have advocated for reparations. See generally
Tuneen E. Chisolm, Comment, Sweep Around Your Own Front Door: Examining the
Argument for Legislative African American Reparations, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 677, 687-89
(1999) (arguing that reparations would bridge the wealth inequality between Blacks
and whites); Alberto B. Lopez, Focusing the Reparations Debate Beyond 1865, 69 TENN. L.
REV. 653 (1995) (suggesting that the reparations movement could be strengthened
by reliance on episodes of racial violence, other than the Civil War, that have
plagued our nation’s history); Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master’s Tools, from the
Bottom Up: Responses to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider
Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863 (1993) (arguing that a wealth redistribution is
necessary in order to achieve racial equality); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It:
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6

legislation on the matter and activists have demonstrated in favor of
7
reparations. To date, however, all attempts to secure legislative or
An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597 (1993) (stating that
slavery contributed to “the chain of poverty and powerlessness that is epidemic in the
African-American community” and that a solution must be created that corrects
these problems); Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case
for Black Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429 (1998) (advocating for reparations and
suggesting that reparations avoid the problems associated with affirmative action);
Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations to Redirect
America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689 (2002) (arguing that the divisive nature of
the reparations debate can be lessened if reparations are viewed as an means to
repair the racial divide in America rather than individual compensatory awards).
The topic was also discussed recently at a symposium at the New York University
School of Law. See Symposium, A Dream Deferred: Comparative and Practical
Considerations for the Black Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447
(2002) (attempting to “fill the gap” between the theoretical aspects of the
reparations movements and its practical and concrete considerations).
A wave of books on the subject have been published recently, among the most
prominent being Randall Robinson’s book The Debt. See ROBINSON, supra note 4
(tracing the history of slavery and advocating for some form of compensation to
Blacks as a result of slavery’s effects); see also SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4
(presenting a collection of essays, articles, and historical documents that explore the
many facets of the reparations debate).
One writer has suggested that society is currently in the fifth of “[f]ive major waves
of political activism [that] have promoted the idea of reparations for African
Americans since the emancipation of slaves.” Chisolm, supra, at 683. Another
suggests that society is in “Stage III” of the reparations movement. Raymond A.
Winbush, Introduction, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at xi, xii. Whatever the
nomenclature, scholars agree that the current impetus for reparations has been
fueled in part by the publicized successes of other reparation suits, such as suits
against the United States by Japanese Americans who were interned during World
War II and suits against European governments by Jewish and other victims of the
Holocaust. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 204-24 (discussing the similarities
between slaves and Jews during the holocaust in order to advance the argument that
slaves are entitled to similar compensation); Brophy, supra note 4, at 499 (arguing
that one factor that led to a discussion about reparation for slavery is the reparations
of other groups, including “Native Americans, Holocaust victims, Japanese
Americans interned during World War II, [and] South Africans”); Chisolm, supra
note 5, at 714-15 (linking Black reparations debate to Japanese American reparations
claims); Verdun, supra, at 646-55 (suggesting that the United States should admit its
wrongful behavior in slavery by giving reparations, just as it admitted that it was
wrong in treating Japanese Americans unfairly during World War II); Winbush,
supra, at xii (presenting a table of payments made to Holocaust survivors).
6. Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) first introduced a bill in 1989 that
would have established a commission to study the effects of slavery and recommend
appropriate remedies. The bill died in committee, and has been reintroduced (and
repeatedly killed) every Congress since then. See H.R. 3745, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R.
1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong. (2003). Representative Conyers has stated, “I
have re-introduced H.R. 40 every Congress since 1989, and will continue to do so
until it’s passed into law.” John Conyers, Jr., Major Issues—Reparations: The
Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans Act, at
http://www.house.gov/conyers/news_reparations.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
In 1993, the Organization of African Unity (comprised of African governments)
adopted a resolution asking the United States for reparations. ROBINSON, supra note
4, at 218-22. See also Tamar Lewin, Calls for Slavery Restitution Getting Louder, N.Y.
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judicial redress have foundered. Congress has not been willing to
8
pass reparations legislation and courts have dismissed tort-based
claims based on statutes of limitations and sovereign immunity
9
grounds.
Unexplored thus far is the alternative of bringing claims under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. The Takings
Clause governs property owners’ rights to just compensation when
the government takes their property, stating that “nor shall private
10
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The
11
clause has spawned volumes of legal writing and a considerable

TIMES, June 4, 2001, at A1 (chronicling the momentum of the reparations movement
and its significant political and legal events).
In 1997, then-President Clinton made statements suggesting that he was
considering a national apology for slavery. However, the idea was eventually
dropped. See Steven A. Holmes, Idea of Apologizing for Slavery Loses Steam, at Least for
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1997, at A15 (discussing that President Clinton put aside the
idea of a national apology to African Americans after listening to the opinions of
advisory commission on race relations); cf. Brophy, supra note 4, at 500-01
(suggesting that the proposed apology for slavery arose due to society entering an
“age of apology”).
7. See Chris L. Jenkins & Hamil R. Harris, Descendants of Slaves Rally for
Reparations, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting on the nations first mass
rally for reparations, attended by thousands of protesters); Courtland Milloy, Cash
Alone Can Never Right Slavery’s Wrongs, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2002, at C1 (reporting on
the reparations rally in Washington, DC, and suggesting that the current goal of the
reparation movement is not money, but rather the “the educating of America about
slavery”); Conrad W. Worrill, The Millions for Reparations Rally: A Grand Success
(noting that more than 50,000 people attended the Washington, DC rally), at
http://www.nbufront.org/html/BushTelegraph/WorrillsWorld/02_08_23_GrandSu
ccess.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
Review).
8. See ROBINSON, supra note 4 (noting that federal reparations legislation has
never made it out of committee, and therefore has never garnered serious debate).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-2 (discussing the different defenses that are
available in takings claims).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that the Takings Clause raises doubt as to the
constitutionality of many modern governmental programs, such as zoning, rent
control, workers’ compensation laws and progressive taxation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995) (suggesting that the
public should rely on the free market, rather than the judicial system, to protect
from uncompensated takings); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111
YALE L.J. 547 (2001) (presenting a framework under which givings, or governmental
distributions of property, should be analyzed); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1165 (1964) (discussing the utility and fairness of the court-drawn line
between compensable and non-compensable governmental takings); William
Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (arguing that the political process should
resolve the limits of the government’s taking power and compensation for takings
should be required only when the political process is not likely to consider property
claims fairly).
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amount of case law. To go along with ordinary takings, scholars
13
14
have examined areas such as regulatory takings, zoning, derivative
15
16
17
takings, and variations such as usings or givings. Some scholars
have gone so far as to suggest that slave owners might have deserved
compensation for the government taking—emancipation—of their
18
slaves. It is surprising, then, that the formidable guns of takings
12. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a
condition to the granting of a redevelopment permit constituted a Takings Clause
violation because the condition was not reasonably related to the proposed
development); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding that a
landowner was due compensation under the Takings Clause where a regulation
rendered his land useless); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Council, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)
(requiring the state to compensate the appellant because the imposed building
permit condition constituted a taking); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that the application of New York’s Landmarks Law,
which prevented the development of Grand Cent. Terminal, did not constitute a
taking of appellants’ property); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding
that property may be regulated, but that should such regulation go too far, it will be
recognized as a taking); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (affirming the governmental taking of private property,
and its conveyance to a private company when its purposes is to promote the public
health and welfare).
13. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11 (discussing the doctrine of regulatory
takings and advancing an economic means by which to determine when a regulation
becomes a taking that requires just compensation).
14. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 263-72 (discussing and giving examples of
how land use regulation can constitute a taking that requires compensation).
15. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV.
277, 290-96 (2001) (arguing that uncompensated derivative takings are both
inefficient and unfair; inefficient because the government is encouraged to exercise
its eminent domain power even when doing so reduces net social welfare and unfair
because it does not evenly distribute the cost of public burdens).
16. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (suggesting that
the Constitution’s Public Use Clause be construed as the basis for a “jurisprudence of
usings”).
17. See generally Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15 (advocating the taxation of
givings, which are governmental advantages bestowed upon individual private
parties).
18. This idea was apparently first raised by James Madison. In a letter to
abolitionist Robert Evans, Madison wrote that slaves “could not be constitutionally
taken away without just compensation.” Letter from James Madison to Robert Evans
(June 15, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 439-47 (1910). See Treanor,
supra note 11, at 839 (discussing Madison’s letter and its importance to determining
an original understanding of the Takings Clause); see also id. at 851 (commenting
further on Madison’s belief that slaveholders were a group particularly threatened by
unjust majoritarian expropriation of property); A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE
MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS—THE COLONIAL PERIOD
136 (1978) (noting the unsuccessful proposal by Gouverneur Morris that the New
York Constitution abolish slavery as soon as possible, “consistent with . . . the private
property of individuals”); id. at 94-95 (noting arguments raised in Massachusetts that
the Constitution should not be read to conflict with existing property rights in
slaves).
The view that slaveowners deserved compensation after their slaves were freed was
also argued by senators who opposed emancipation. See Lea S. Vandervelde, The
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 444 n.41 (1989) (citing
a statement in the Congressional Record by an opponent of emancipation that
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scholarship have never trained on one of the greatest
uncompensated takings in American history: the enslavement of
millions of Africans for nearly half the nation’s history, the
government-sanctioned taking of their property rights of selfownership, and the subsequent impoverishment of their
19
This Article begins the discussion of slavery as a
descendants.
20
Takings Clause violation.
uncompensated emancipation would violate the Takings Clause). For a modern
discussion of the position that abolition of slavery was theft from slave owners, see,
for example, YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed.
1997); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 72 (2000) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment itself expropriated legal ‘property’—
that is, slaves—without compensation.”); Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum
Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We
Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1149 (2001) (suggesting that the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment limiting liability to slaveowners was
necessary or else “a careful lawyer imbued with respect for the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment might suggest that the United States would indeed have a duty to
compensate at least some slave owners for the loss of their property”); Carol M. Rose,
Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1,
24-28 (2000) (arguing that emancipation of slaves was one of a limited number of
“extraordinary, even revolutionary, disruptions of property rights” in the country’s
history).
19. The only likely rival for the dubious honor of “greatest uncompensated
taking on American history” would be the genocide and land seizure perpetuated
against Native Americans. Cf. Rose, supra note 18, at 30-37 (arguing that the taking
of land from Native Americans, like the emancipation of slaves, was also an
“extraordinary” taking).
Two other major takings targeted at minority groups—the government seizure of
Mormon property in the late nineteenth century, and the World War II era
confiscation of property belonging to Americans of Japanese ancestry—were smaller
in magnitude and involved fewer victims. See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 363-68
(1987) (discussing government oppression, including the confiscation of property, of
Americans of Japanese ancestry); Nathan B. Oman, Book Review, The Story of a
Forgotten Battle: Reviewing the Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in
Nineteenth Century America, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745, 750-51 (2002) (discussing
government harassment of Mormons, including the taking of Mormon church
property).
20. There does not appear to be any other treatment of this subject, either in
articles, books, or non-legal publications. Only a few other sources even obliquely
hint at the idea. For example, Harper’s Magazine conducted an interview with four
attorneys on legal theories of reparations, and one potential theory which was
mentioned in passing (and quickly dismissed) was a potential suit under the Takings
Clause for recovery of the “forty acres and a mule” promised to freed slaves after
emancipation. See Does America Owe a Debt to the Descendants of Its Slaves?, supra note 4,
at 83 (suggesting that voiding of the forty-acres promise by President Andrew
Johnson could be compensable under the Takings Clause); see also infra notes 242243 and accompanying text (discussing the “40 acres and a mule” proposal).
Reparations scholars have also suggested that slave descendants might have takings
claims if the government improperly extinguished any vested tort claims for
reparations they possessed. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Reparations for the Descendants of
African Slaves, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 57, 61-62 (stating that slave
descendants’ “claim for reparations based on the slave experience [is] a property
claim, protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution”). The
argument that slaves would have a takings claim if the government extinguished their
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The first step in arguing that slavery was a Takings Clause violation
is to establish that slaves, like other people, had a property interest in
their persons—a property right of self-ownership. Part I of this
Article examines the sources and characteristics of that property
right. The second step is to examine the institution of slavery to
determine whether it can be reconceptualized as a taking of the selfownership property rights of slaves. Part II of this Article discusses
the different ways slavery can be conceived as a taking.
Potential constitutional endorsement of slavery is a serious obstacle
to viewing slavery as a taking. This problem is addressed in Part III,
which concludes that any constitutional acceptance of slavery is not
fatal to takings claims, especially given the strong parallels between
the purpose of the Takings Clause and the facts of the slavery taking.
Thus, Parts I through III establish that slavery should be considered a
Takings Clause violation. Slavery contains the basic requirements for
a takings violation, and any problems arising from characteristics
unique to slavery are not fatal. Part IV then describes the prima facie
takings case.
After making the case that slavery is a Takings Clause violation, Part
V discusses potential effects of this conclusion in both judicial and
legislative forums. Advocates bringing a takings claim in court could
avoid some of the problems that have bedeviled traditional
21
reparations suits, such as government sovereign immunity.
Conservative courts, which have been receptive to takings claims over
the past century, may prove more amenable to these property-based
claims for compensation than they have been towards tort-based
reparations claims. In addition, the takings argument provides added
support to convince legislators to provide compensation to
descendants of slaves. Finally, Part VI summarizes what takings claims
add to the reparations debate, and shows why there is much to be

tort compensation claims is of course substantively different than the argument that
slavery itself was a Takings Clause violation.
Carol Rose also hints at the potential taking, but leaves it unexplored, in her
discussion suggesting that emancipation was a taking:
Unquestionably, the institution of slavery depended on a prior
expropriation—that is, of the slaves’ bodies from themselves—a fact that
certainly acted as a justification for emancipation. Nevertheless, once the
institution of slavery was established, slaves represented a substantial capital
investment for their owners, who could and did argue that uncompensated
emancipation was an unconstitutional taking of their property.
Rose, supra note 18, at 24-25. Although recognizing in passing the taking of slaves’
rights involved, Rose does not explore this taking in any greater detail.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how the sovereign immunity
defense does not apply to takings claims).
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gained from recognizing that slavery, in addition to its many other
characteristics, was also a national violation of the Takings Clause.
I.

SLAVES POSSESSED A PROPERTY RIGHT OF SELF-OWNERSHIP

The first step in showing a Takings Clause violation is to establish
the existence of the property right involved: self-ownership. Section
A of this part examines the right’s origin, Section B discusses the
characteristics of that right, and Section C considers whether the
right of self-ownership is a constitutionally protected property right.
A. A Conceptual Foundation
Philosophers have long discussed the idea that bodily integrity may
be an independent property right. Some scholars have called the
22
idea of a self-ownership right “possessive individualism.”
While
possessive individualism includes several slightly different strands of
thought, the underlying idea is that each individual is “the proprietor
23
of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”
This argument was made by John Locke, who famously stated:
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he
hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his
own, and thereby makes it his property. . . . For this labour being
22. See CRAWFORD B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962) (suggesting that problems associated with
modern liberal-democratic theory have their roots in a seventeenth century notion of
possessive individualism, which suggests that a person is “essentially the proprietor of
his own person or capacities” and owes nothing to the larger social whole); see also
JOSEPH H. CARENS, DEMOCRACY AND POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: THE INTELLECTUAL
LEGACY OF C. B. MACPHERSON (1993) (responding and critiquing the concept of
possessive individualism as defined and analyzed by MacPherson); JULES TOWNSHEND,
C. B. MACPHERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2000) (synthesizing and
defending the philosophical and political critiques of MacPherson’s democratic
theory of possessive individualism and advocating for the incorporation of his
principal into modern social theory).
Possessive individualism draws from Hobbes as well as Locke. MACPHERSON, supra,
at 3-4. Possessive individualism has influenced modern property law discussion. For
example, some scholars have used it to justify the existence of intellectual property
law. One commentator writes that “the concept of ‘authorship’ and the term
‘author’ had acquired special weight by 1710 through their association with the
theme of ‘possessive individualism’ in general social thought. John Locke’s version
of individualism at least implicitly identified the individual’s proprietorship over
himself as a function of ‘authorship.’” Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 469-70 (1991) (internal citations
omitted).
23. MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 3.
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the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can
24
have a right to what that is once joined to . . . .

This statement is consistent with other arguments made
25
throughout Locke’s writings. One of Locke’s similar statements is
26
that a man’s property includes his “Life, Liberty and Estate.” By
including life and liberty as elements of property, Locke in turn
incorporates his expansive conceptions of those terms into the idea
27
of property.
And for Locke, a primary purpose for the very
existence of government was the protection of this fundamental
interest in property, which, if defined as used earlier in the same
28
treatise, includes self-ownership.
The right of self-ownership is
24. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed.,
Everyman 1993) (1690) (emphasis added). See generally Jeffrey S. Koehlinger,
Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal Tradition: Rethinking the Modern
Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 758-59 (1990).
25. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 26 (James H. Tully
ed., William Popple trans., 1983) (1689) (arguing that civil interests include “Life,
Liberty, Health, and Indolency of Body”); LOCKE, supra note 24, at 204 (defining
property as that “which men have in their persons as well as goods”).
Extension of Lockean principles to cover slaves is probably not something Locke
envisioned. See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North
America, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1768-70 (1996) (discussing Locke’s authorship of
the pro-slavery Carolina constitution); cf. LOCKE, supra note 24, at 125-27 (discussing
property ownership in a servant’s labor); MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 215-17
(discussing Locke’s conception of labor of servants). However, Locke did make
several fierce critiques of slavery, including a rhetorical denunciation that begins the
first Treatise on Government. See LOCKE, supra note 24, at 5 (“Slavery is so vile and
miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and
courage of our nation; that ‘tis hardly to be conceived, that an Englishman, much
less a gentleman, should plead for it.”).
26. LOCKE, supra note 24, at 157.
27. For example, Locke’s writings on liberty state that man has “a liberty to
dispose, and order, as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole
property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is; and therein not to be
subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.” Id. at 142.
Similarly, there is some overlap between the idea of self-ownership in one’s
property right, and bodily integrity as a life right. One commentator has written, “if
life means what it did when the Framers drafted the Constitution, bodily integrity is
part and parcel of the concept.” Sheldon Gelman, “Life” and “Liberty”: Their Original
Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance in the Debate over Abortion Rights,
78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 588 (1994). That author argues that the Framers believed that
life, rather than liberty, was “the most basic right”; and “this life include[d] more
than mere biological existence; it also encompasses physical integrity, health and
indolency of body, and even a minimum quality of life.” Id. (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
28. Locke wrote that “[t]he great and chief end therefore, of men’s uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of
their property.” LOCKE, supra note 24, at 178. In Watson v. Branch County Bank, one
commentator, regarding this passage, wrote:
John Locke defined “property” to include the sum of the individual’s legally
cognizable attributes, “that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate.” When he wrote,
“The great and chief end . . . of Mens uniting into Commonwealths, and
putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property,”
Locke was referring to this broad conception of property.
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subject to certain limitations in Lockean theory; for example, one’s
29
property right in oneself is not alienable.
The Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of Locke’s
writings, and Locke’s ideas influenced them in drafting the
30
Constitution and its amendments.
Statements made by James
Madison seem to indicate that he espoused this idea of a property
interest in one’s own body. He argued that property “embraces
31
everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right.”
While Locke was not the only philosopher or writer to influence the
32
Framers, there is little reason to doubt his influence; his strong ideas
on self-ownership are not contradicted by other major influential
33
figures of the time. In fact, a similar statement was made by Chief
Justice John Marshall, who wrote:
380 F. Supp. 945, 968 n.19 (W.D. Mich. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, Watson v.
Branch County Bank, 516 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1975) (internal citations omitted).
29. Locke’s statement that “every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no
Body has any Right to but himself” can be read to support the inalienability of selfownership. LOCKE, supra note 24, at 305-06.
30. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 7072 (1991) (asserting that Locke’s theories on natural rights provided a basis for the
Framers’ views on private property); Joseph Becker, Procrustean Jurisprudence: An
Austrian School Economic Critique of the Separation and Regulation of Liberties in the
Twentieth Century United States, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 671, 679 (1995) (noting that
Jeffersonian and Lockean natural law theory greatly influenced the Framers of the
Constitution); Koehlinger, supra note 24, at 731-35 (asserting that Locke’s liberal
traditions inspired the prominent leaders of the United States during its early
history).
31. James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, in 14 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266-68 (1983); Becker, supra note 30, at 679 (noting that Madison’s
views on property extended to such things as one’s opinions and beliefs).
32. Gordon S. Wood has suggested that the Framers, though steeped in a
Lockean conception of property, were moving beyond that conception by the 1780s.
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 219 (1998).
If true, this would make less compelling the notion that the Framers meant to enact
a Lockean conception of property into the Takings Clause. However, Wood argues
that this conception was widely held prior to the framing; thus, if the Framers had
wished to exclude a Lockean concept of property, they might have been expected to
do so explicitly.
William Treanor has also argued that Locke had less of an influence on the
Framers than Epstein and others have suggested, positing, “Epstein’s equation of
Lockean ideology with the political thought behind the Takings Clause is incorrect.
While it would be wrong to say that Locke had no influence on the founding
generation, it is equally incorrect to describe Lockean liberalism as the ideology of
the framing.” Treanor, supra note 11, at 824.
33. For example, Jeremy Bentham’s idea that property relies on the stability
engendered by the protection of investment-backed expectations dovetails well with
the existence of property rights of self-ownership. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 111-13 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (1802) (“The idea of property consists
in an established expectation; in the persuasion of being able to draw such and such
advantage from the thing possessed . . . .”).
In addition, self-ownership seems implicit in Bentham’s account of how selfinterest gives rise to societal regimes of property protection. This idea is in turn
drawn from Hume’s theory on property, which was based on security. DAVID HUME,
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That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labour, is
generally admitted; and that no other person can rightfully deprive
him of those fruits, and appropriate them against his will, seems to
34
be the necessary result of this admission.

To be clear, these statements express an ideal of self-ownership,
which some of the Framers, due to racial prejudices, may not have
felt extended to Blacks or slaves. For example, Marshall owned
35
36
slaves and Locke drafted the pro-slavery Carolina constitution.
However, despite any prejudices, what these writers actually
articulated was an ideal of self-ownership that, when examined free
from racist ideas, seems to apply equally to Blacks, including slaves.
Numerous legal commentators and philosophers have similarly
37
advocated the recognition of some form of self-ownership.
Margaret Radin writes, “the body is quintessentially personal property
38
because it is literally constitutive of one’s personhood.” Others have
suggested expanding the principle; famously, Charles Reich
39
suggested granting property protection to government benefits.
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 542 (Ernest C. Mosser ed., Penguin Books 1969)
(1739) (“Our property is nothing but those goods, whose constant possession is
establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice.”).
34. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825). But cf. Guyora Binder,
The Slavery of Emancipation, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2063, 2068 n.28 (1996) (suggesting
that Marshall slightly overstated Locke’s argument).
Despite his eloquent language, Marshall sanctioned the slave trade in The Antelope,
based on a belief that positive law overruled the natural law principle. See 23 U.S. at
120 (“That [slavery] is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied.”); see also
Binder, supra, at 2077-81 (discussing Marshall’s opinion as an example of “the
interpenetration of the critique and legitimation of slavery in antebellum American
culture”).
35. Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall in Historical Perspective, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 137, 160 (1997).
36. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1768-70.
37. See Carole Pateman, Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization
and a Tale of Two Concepts, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 20, 22-27 (2002) (noting numerous
statements by diverse philosophers accepting a principle of self-ownership); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 53-60 (1995) (arguing that
as a system is “vastly inferior to a position of self-ownership.”); THOMAS D. MORRIS,
SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 32-33 (1996); ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 171-72 (1974); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE
PROPERTY 177-83 (1990).
38. Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 966 (1981)
[hereinafter Radin, Property and Personhood]. Radin suggests that the tort of assault is
based on this property interest: “Interference with my body is interference with my
personal property.” Id.
39. See Charles Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965) (relating social welfare to self-ownership and
discussing how to protect that welfare); Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733, 786-87 (1964) (arguing that government benefits must be considered a property
right in order to protect the individual from totally discretionary government
power). These two articles by Reich were cited by Justice Brennan in his opinion in
Goldberg v. Kelly, which held that removal of welfare rights was subject to
constitutional constraints. 397 U.S. 254, 265 n.8 (1970) (citing Reich’s articles as
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Self-ownership can be viewed as simply ownership of one’s physical
40
Legal scholars widely accept this
body and bodily integrity.
41
minimum definition of self-ownership. A more expansive definition
would view self-ownership as ownership of one’s liberty—less about
direct ownership of one’s body, and more about ownership of the
42
ability to make choices. In that sense, the right of self-ownership
can be seen as related to the constitutional rights of privacy and of
43
familial integrity. Under either a limited or an expanded right of
44
self-ownership, slaves were the owners of that right.
support for the proposition that “[i]t may be realistic today to regard welfare
entitlements as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”). If government benefits are a
property right, then ownership of one’s body—a more important interest—should be
considered a property right as well.
40. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld stated that bodily integrity was a type of in rem
property right. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1918), reprinted in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 85 (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed., 1964). Hohfeld also felt that individual liberty, and even rights of
consortium and personal privacy, could be conceived as in rem property rights. Id.;
see also Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 782 (2001) (noting that Hohfeld believed that in rem rights related to both
tangibles and intangibles).
41. See, e.g., BARZEL, supra note 18, at 113 (“The current prohibition of slavery
implies that each individual is the owner of the capital asset embedded in himself or
herself.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at vii (theorizing that property law encompasses
rights that people have both in themselves and in external things). Cf. Radin,
Property and Personhood, supra note 38, at 965 (suggesting that Lockean analysis shows
self-ownership in the physical body); Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1905 (1987) [hereinafter Radin, Market-Inalienability] (arguing that a
person cannot have free will if they are subject to commodification). But see Michelle
Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69
TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990) (arguing that there is currently no defined legal
position regarding property rights in the human body).
42. Self-ownership can also be seen as a right to one’s morality—that decisions a
person makes will reflect her choices. See EPSTEIN, supra note 37, at 53 (equating selfownership with autonomy); Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1885-86
(discussing self-ownership as individual control). In this sense, self-ownership is not
unlike the ownership of one’s own soul. See generally RICHARD SWINBURNE, EVOLUTION
OF THE SOUL (1997) (discussing concept of the soul in modern civilization).
Self-ownership is also, in a sense, ownership of one’s identity, including one’s
racial identity. Cf. Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709,
1724-37 (1993) (critiquing the proposition that “American law has recognized a
property interest in whiteness”).
43. See generally Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (finding
that an ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single
family, but defined family to exclude grandchildren, intruded on family sanctity and
was unconstitutional on due process grounds); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166
(1973) (holding that state anti-abortion laws violated plaintiff’s right to personal
liberty); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding an implicit right
to privacy in the penumbra to the Bill of Rights to the Constitution that includes that
right to use birth control); see also id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (underscoring
that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to marry and raise a family). But
cf. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 620-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that
prisoners do not have a right to procreate).
44. But cf. Binder, supra note 34, at 2093-94 (suggesting that self-ownership is a
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B. Characteristics of the Self-Ownership Right
The property right of self-ownership has two salient characteristics:
it is universal and it is inalienable. These characteristics result in an
unusual treatment of the self-ownership right under property law.
This Section examines these characteristics and how they relate to the
treatment of slavery under the takings clause.
1.

Universality
Self-ownership is universal because it derives from the self, and all
people have a self. Philosophers who discuss the existence of self45
ownership agree on its universality.
The universality of selfownership is a natural derivative of the principle of equality: All
46
people, being equal, have self-ownership. The acceptance of this
principle by the Framers is suggested in the Declaration of
Independence, which states, “all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
47
among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” The
48
As
universality of self-ownership has a long philosophical history.
applied to the discussion of slavery, the universality of self-ownership
means that every slave possessed this property right.
2.

Inalienability
The property right of self-ownership is inalienable. That is, unlike
many other property rights that may be freely traded, bought, sold, or
otherwise commodified, the right of self-ownership can never be

spectrum and denying that enslavement fully encompassed that spectrum).
45. See MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 231-35 (noting that an essential part of
Locke’s individualism is the notion that every person is “the absolute proprietor” of
his or her own person); Pateman, supra note 37, at 22-27 (noting that self-ownership
is a standard term that is widely accepted and needs no further explanation).
46. See Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 38, at 965-66 (exploring the
notion that if one owns one’s body, then everyone has self-ownership rights).
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Similarly, Article 1
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights.” G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. I, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/ (on file with the American
University Law Review).
48. See LOCKE, supra note 24, at 287-88 (noting that “every man” possesses selfownership); MACPHERSON, supra note 22, at 229-35; Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual
Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind. L.J. 803, 807-09 (2001). To the
extent that self-ownership includes a right to make choices, a right to enjoy the
benefits of one’s good choices and the consequences of harmful choices, it is akin to
the soul, which has traditionally been of universal character. See generally ETIENNE
GILSON & THOMAS LANGEN, MODERN PHILOSOPHY: DESCARTES TO KANT 62-72 (1963)
[hereinafter MODERN PHILOSOPHY] (describing Cartesian conception of the
universality of the soul).
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49

severed from its source, the person. Inalienability of personhood is
important because the alternative, commodification, can have
50
Commodification of the self, according to
deleterious effects.
Radin, “undermines personal identity by conceiving of personal
attributes, relationships, and philosophical and moral commitments
as monetizable and alienable from the self” and does “violence to our
51
deepest understanding of what it is to be human.”
Such
depersonalization is avoided through the use of an inalienability
52
rule, the use of which is consistent with the philosophical

49. Margaret Radin writes that inalienability depends upon “the notion of
alienation as a separation of something—an entitlement, right, or attribute—from its
holder.” Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1852. See Andrew Koppelman,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 480, 491
(noting that Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), held that thirteenth amendment
personal liberty rights are inalienable).
Not all scholars accept the idea of inalienability of personhood. See Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972) (arguing that personhood
is alienable as evidenced by society’s valuation of personal attributes and moral
commitments, among other things); see also Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 971-72 (1985) (suggesting that alienation should only be
restrained where required by harmful externalities). If self-ownership is to be
considered alienable, as these scholars have suggested, then the taking of selfownership should be a compensable taking like the taking of other alienable
property.
50. Commodification is a process of assigning an economic value to an item.
Radin argues that personhood, or self-ownership, should not be subject to
commodification. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1905-15.
51. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 39, at 1905-06. Another writer notes:
Complete alienability over one’s body, however, may negatively affect
personhood. An individual’s integrity is affected negatively by being
discussed in market rhetoric as a fungible commodity, because such
terminology ignores the unique qualities and differences between
individuals. For example, many commentators object to pornography
because it reifies and commodifies women. Women become sex objects,
rather than sexual individuals, who have a monetary value based on their
appearance or sexual repertoire. Similarly, recognizing body parts as fully
alienable property would encourage the perception of body parts as
interchangeable commodities and undermine the recognition of the human
body as the physical embodiment of the personality.
Bray, supra note 41, at 241 (citations omitted).
Recent debates have touched on the issue of payment for another’s reproductive
ability. Another debate has emerged over controversial offers to pay crack addicts,
who are mostly Black, to be sterilized. See Cecilia M. Vega, Sterilization Offer to Addicts
Reopens Ethics Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at B1 (describing the ethical concerns
about paying men and women for sterilization).
52. Radin, Market-Inalienability, supra note 41, at 1905-15 (proposing that personal
identity is undermined when one views personal attributes such as politics, work,
religion, sex, and moral commitments as commodified objects rather than integral
components of oneself); see also Bray, supra note 41, at 241 (proffering that the law
should recognize the noncommodification of the human body and adopt
approaches that will protect the personal significance of potential property such as
reproductive or sexual services).
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53

foundations of the concept of self-ownership. This approach avoids
54
dangers such as economic coercion that may arise from alienability.
The inalienable nature of the self-ownership property right is not
the same as a person’s property right in removed body parts, which
some courts have deemed to be alienable property. Moore v. Regents of
55
the University of California held that deceptive removal of fluids and
56
spleen from a patient was not conversion. The Moore majority found
that the plaintiff’s claim failed because no “ownership or right of
possession” was interfered with, despite the taking of his body parts
57
without his informed consent. Similarly, courts have been divided
58
on the alienability of reproductive matter.
Scholars have debated the importance and application of
59
alienability. Notwithstanding the differing views on alienability of
body parts or reproductive material, it seems clear that the right of
self-ownership over one’s contiguous body is not affected. A person’s
53. See supra Part I.A (demonstrating that Locke’s idea of self-ownership included
inalienability).
54. See Bray, supra note 41, at 242 (asserting that an exchange of monetary
compensation for body parts will unduly compel individuals to sell their bodies, thus
further dividing society into classes based on wealth).
55. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
56. Id. at 488-89.
57. Id.
58. In a series of decisions pertaining to a probate case, the California appeals
court noted that frozen sperm was not normal personal property. Hecht v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the probate court had
jurisdiction over the decedent’s frozen sperm because decedent’s interest in the
sperm gave rise to a property interest), rev’d, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to her husband’s frozen sperm after his
death). For background on the case, see Keith Sealing, Teaching Fundamental
Learning Techniques with Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 46 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 755, 770-72 (2002). However, in an unusual disposition, the court found that
the sperm was property only as to the decedent’s girlfriend, since only she could use
it. Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227.
In another case dealing with reproductive material, a court refused to enforce a
contract granting a divorced wife custody and use of viable frozen pre-embryos,
finding that standard property and contract rules did not apply where a man might
become a parent against his will. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 2000).
Finally, there is some debate in whether a self-ownership right includes the right to
end one’s own life. See Roger Friedman, It’s My Body and I’ll Die if I Want To: A
Property-Based Argument in Support of Assisted Suicide, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
183 (1995). These and the many other cases and articles on the topic are interesting
and reflect the difficulty courts have experienced in dealing with these complicated
issues. However, these cases are neither controlling nor particularly applicable in the
context of slaves’ self-ownership rights.
59. For example, the holding in Moore has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Bray,
supra note 41, at 238-39 (arguing that Moore is bad policy because it failed to
“affirmatively delineate individuals’ interest in their bodies”); Jennifer Lavoie, Note,
Ownership of Human Tissue: Life After Moore v. Regents of the University of California,
75 VA. L. REV. 1363 (1989) (arguing that the Moore decision to treat human tissues as
property and subject to the tort of conversion was problematic in that it violates
established regulations, case law, and legislation).
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property right of self-ownership is qualitatively different than rights to
60
body parts or reproductive material.
The inalienability of the right of self-ownership distinguishes it
from other property rights in ways that are highly relevant when
analyzing slavery. For example, one potential obstacle for bringing a
takings claim—the possibility of third-party ownership—is rendered
moot because of the inalienable nature of the right of self ownership.
Another potential obstacle for bringing a takings claim—the
possibility of third-party ownership—is also rendered moot because
of the inalienable nature of the right of self-ownership. That is, if
self-ownership were a type of normally alienable property, it might be
necessary to inquire whether slaves themselves held ownership of this
property or whether it had been previously transferred to third
61
parties such as kings or rulers.
The inalienable nature of selfownership obviates the need for any such inquiry.
Importantly, inalienability does not preclude compensation for
wrongful takings. While the Takings Clause may seem designed to
compensate the loss of alienable property, it does not distinguish
60. The Moore court based its holding on the fact that the cells were no longer
part of Moore’s person:
Since Moore clearly did not expect to retain possession of his cells following
their removal, to sue for their conversion he must have retained an ownership
interest in them. But there are several reasons to doubt that he did retain
any such interest. First, no reported judicial decision supports Moore’s
claim, either directly or by close analogy. Second, California statutory law
drastically limits any continuing interest of a patient in excised cells. Third,
the subject matters of the Regents’ patent—the patented cell line and the
products derived from it—cannot be Moore’s property.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 488-89 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Without
such a limitation, extension of Moore might pose a problem for the entire theory of
self-ownership. After all, if the government can take a spleen without compensation,
then why not a kidney, a leg, a heart, or even an entire body? This kind of slipperyslope parade of horrors was invoked by a Moore dissenter, who compared the taking
of Moore’s organs to slavery. Id. at 515 (Mosk, J., dissenting). See also Radin, Property
and Personhood, supra note 38, at 966 (arguing that it is “appropriate to call parts of
the body property only after they have been removed from the system”).
61. As unpleasant as such a possibility sounds today, it could certainly be a legal
possibility. Legal history shows the existence of this structure. For example, under
Roman law, families were under the almost complete dominion of the head of the
family, typically the patriarch. The head of the family had power over the children,
including selling them into slavery to satisfy his debts. See generally Lisa S. Morin,
Roman Family Law and Traditions (describing the Roman patriarch’s rights and total
control over the family), available at http://bama.ua.edu/~morin002 (last visited
Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). Similarly, slaves’
original property rights may have resided in a family head, a head-of-state, or other
third party.
In addition to recognizing an inalienable right of self-ownership, there are other
ways to avoid third-party ownership problems. For instance, if the right of selfownership was considered alienable, its original owner would of course be the slave
himself. Under such a scenario, it might be possible to trace a chain of title and
show a taking.
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between alienable and inalienable property. Nothing in the nature
of inalienability prevents property owners whose property was
wrongfully taken from seeking redress. If anything, compensation is
more appropriate for the greater harm of taking inalienable property.
Given society’s decision, as embodied in the Takings Clause, to
regularly compensate for takings of entitlement protected by a
property rule, compensation should be granted a fortiori for takings of
entitlements protected by the stronger inalienability rule. In such
cases, compensation does not compromise the underlying
62
entitlement, but rather constitutes recognition of a wrong. Such
one-time compensation is unlikely to lead to commodification or
future markets in self-ownership, and thus is consistent with
characterizing personhood as inalienable.
C. Self-Ownership as Constitutionally Protected Property
The Supreme Court has emphasized that all takings claimants must
show that they possessed a constitutionally protected property
interest, an exercise complicated by the lack of a definition within the
63
Constitution for the term “property.”
To further complicate
matters, the Court has been inconsistent on how constitutional
property is to be defined. On the one hand, the Court stated that,
“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
64
as state law . . . .”
Such language suggests that state law would
62. See Matsuda, supra note 19, at 394-95 (discussing the appropriateness of
monetary reparation for wrongdoing). The government should not have the power
to turn people into slaves, but given that it did, it should at the very least
acknowledge the wrong by paying compensation. In this instance, compensation is a
punishment meant to express outrage at the act, not a statement that the act can be
easily “paid for” in cash. Cf. id. at 395 (suggesting that monetary reparations cannot
make up for past wrongs, but rather have a symbolic function in recognizing the
harm). Such punishment, like punitive damages, may appropriately be greatly in
excess of the actual harm caused, in order to signal the state’s belief that the
behavior must be prevented. The harm of slavery is clearly the enslavement itself,
not the mere failure to compensate. See Anthony J. Sebok, Reparations, Unjust
Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 651, 657 (2003) (“What was wrong about slavery . . . was not . . . that they
were not paid. What was wrong about chattel slavery is rooted in the ideology of
racial oppression.”).
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 888 (2000) (noting that before the Court entertains whether a property interest
has been taken, it first analyzes whether a claimant has a cognizable interest in such
property); id. at 891 & n.20 (citing commentators suggesting that the meaning of
“property” in the takings context is not well defined); EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 22
(suggesting how to define property since it is not defined in the Constitution).
64. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that state law failed
to substantiate that a college professor had a protected interest in continued
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determine whether a property right existed. On the other hand, the
Court has also suggested that a federal standard exists, writing that
“[t]he hallmark of a constitutionally protected property interest is the
66
right to exclude others.”
Although the Court has been less than clear on how the two
67
standards interact, self-ownership is protected under either
standard. As property over which the owner has the right to exclude
others, self-ownership is protected under the federal standard.
Under the state law approach a more complicated analysis seems to
68
be required. However, given the broad philosophical support for
self-ownership discussed above, self-ownership could be considered
one of the common law “background principles of property law”
which are assumed to be constitutionally protected property interests
69
under state law.
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING SLAVERY AS A TAKING
Part I established the existence of a constitutionally protected
property right of self-ownership. This Part examines whether slavery
can accurately be called a taking of that property right. Section A
contains preliminary inquiries on whether slavery was a property
institution and on whether the same government exists today as
existed at the time of the taking. Section B addresses how slavery fits
into the different branches of takings law:
physical takings,

employment with his employer, and as such, the employer did not violate the
professor’s due process rights by not giving reasons for their decision not to re-hire
him); see also Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 163-68 (1998) (noting that
the Constitution does not create property interests, but instead protects such
interests that are created by an independent source such as state law).
65. See FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 66 (arguing that, under Takings Clause analysis,
state law sources establish what constitutes a cognizable property interest).
66. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 673 (1999).
67. See Merrill, supra note 63, at 895-915 (discussing the incongruity of these
different standards).
68. A state-by-state analysis of property law would be quite complicated and is
beyond the scope of this Article. Among the complicating factors are that numerous
states did not exist at the adoption of the Takings Clause; each state has its own
takings clause, adopted at different times, and including different protections; and
each state has different case law on takings.
In addition to the parsing of various state laws required to establish legal
standards, any allocation of slaves to different states would be a terribly complicated
project. For example, slaves often moved in interstate commerce and thus were
subject at times to the laws of one state, and at times to the laws of another; some
states which were created from parts of other states or other nations; some states
existed as federal territories.
69. Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168. It seems unlikely that any state law specifically
proscribed the recognition of slaves’ self-ownership.
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regulatory takings, and the theoretical areas of derivative takings and
givings.
A. Preliminary Inquiries
There are two areas of preliminary inquiry. The first is whether
slavery was an institution of property at all, or simply a system of
contracts; and the second is whether the government entity that
existed during slavery can be considered the same government entity
as exists today.
1.

Determining whether slavery constituted an institution of property or
contract
Takings compensation is only available for interference with
70
property. No taking would lie if slavery was a system of contracts or
71
other laws.
This Section analyzes whether slavery is properly
considered a property institution.

70. Even if slavery was viewed as an institution of contract, there might be reasons
why the Takings Clause would trigger. Commentators have suggested that Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which held that a condition
requiring property owners to grant the public an easement across their beachfront
property constituted a compensable taking, was actually a case involving a bargain
and exchange. The Supreme Court took exception to the “terms of [the] trade” and
mandated compensation because “the ‘bargain’ between the coastal commission and
Nollan was so one-sided as to be unconscionable.” FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 58. The
same can be said of slavery; if indeed slavery involved a contract between owners and
slaves, the bargain involved was also “so one-sided as to be unconscionable” and
would thus merit takings compensation. Id. Epstein makes a similar point in
analyzing whether or not freedom of contract ought to allow one to enter into a
contract of slavery. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 20 n.6 (1992) (stating
that the idea of allowing self-sale into slavery is a “very hard question” since such sales
would likely be “tainted with incompetence, fraud, and duress”); NOZICK, supra note
37, at 331 (allowing for “voluntary” slavery entered into by contract).
71. There is some evidence that at least some slaves had their legal status
changed through operation of the criminal law. For instance, many Blacks were
sentenced to slavery in Africa and sold to traders as punishment for criminal
offenses. See ADU BOAHEN ET AL., TOPICS IN WEST AFRICAN HISTORY 108-10 (2d ed.
1986); cf. David Galenson, Indentured Servitude, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN
SLAVERY 351 (Randall M. Miller & John David Smith eds., 1988) (stating that more
than 300,000 convicts were sentenced to transportation to America and sold as
indentured servants). However, in the case of slaves, often this “criminal”
punishment was completely arbitrary, with new crimes punished retroactively in
proportion to a slave trader’s needs. Id. This suggests that many “criminal” cases
would not pass muster in the American legal system, where generally, in the absence
of the violation of a known criminal law, there is no punishment. This is the criminal
law maxim of nula poena sine lege. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the history of the legal maxim nula poena sine lege that
recognizes that states may only punish people for committing a crime if a statute
authorizes such punishment before the crime is committed).
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Similarities to indenture and peonage

One might be tempted to characterize slavery as a system of
contract because slavery has historically been connected with
indenture, and indentured servants entered into their indentures
72
through contracts.
Additional evidence of slavery as a contract
regime might be adduced from the legal treatment of peonage,
which replaced slavery in many areas after emancipation and has
73
been termed “de facto slavery.”
Legally, peonage, which
commentators find so similar to slavery, was treated as a contract
74
regime.
Slavery, however, differed from both indenture and peonage in a
very important respect. Slavery was a system of in rem rights—that is,
vaguely defined rights enforceable against a large body of
undetermined parties—and such rights have traditionally been
75
associated with property.
In contrast, peonage and indenture
involved in personam rights—more precisely, defined rights
enforceable against specific parties—and those kinds of rights have
76
traditionally been associated with contract. For example, a contract
between A and B might create a right for A to be paid one hundred
dollars for B to receive specified goods. These precisely defined
rights against specified parties are typical in personam rights, which are
normally associated with contracts. If B owns property, she may have
a right of quiet enjoyment, enforceable against any party. That
vaguely defined right, enforceable against an indeterminate number
77
of parties, is a typical in rem right.

72. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1715-25 (1996) (discussing indenture); see also
Galenson, supra note 71, at 351 (noting that large numbers of white immigrants used
indenture as a means of financing transatlantic passage, signing contracts to work for
planters for a set number of years in exchange for those planters paying their fare).
73. See Aziz Z. Huq, Note, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 351,
354-55 (2001) (examining the history and statutory authorization of peonage as a
system of coerced labor). Some commentators have even suggested that peonage
was worse than chattel slavery. See 1 I WAS BORN A SLAVE xxvii (Yuval Taylor ed.,
1999) (noting that peonage was “in some ways even worse” than slavery, since masters
had no capital invested in peons and thus could mistreat them “without monetary
loss”).
74. See Huq, supra note 73, at 379-84 (stating that federal courts defined peonage
narrowly to require “indebtedness” resulting from a contractual agreement).
75. See HOHFELD, supra note 40, at 70-74 (describing in rem rights as enforceable
against the world); see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79 (noting that in
rem rights are associated with property rights).
76. See HOHFELD, supra note 40, at 70-74 (describing in personam rights as those
rights that either reside in or are available against a single person); see also Merrill &
Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79 (noting that in personam rights are associated with
contract rights).
77. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 40, at 776-79.
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Indentured servants obligated themselves to serve a particular
78
master for a specific length of time. The master’s rights, defined
and controlled by the indenture and enforceable only by the master,
were in personam. While slavery granted some in personam rights to
slave owners, unlike indenture, it had a significant in rem component.
Specifically, slavery created numerous in rem rules—rights that the
community possessed against slaves. Depending on the jurisdiction,
slaves were subject to legal prohibitions on owning property, making
contracts, inheriting property, marrying, voting, or obtaining an
79
education.
Such restrictions were in rem because they could be
enforced by the community, and not just by specific individual
80
rightholders. Slavery’s reliance on in rem rights demonstrates that it
was a property institution, unlike the contract-based indenture
81
system.
Peonage is similarly distinct from slavery. As one commentator
notes, peonage “approximated slavery in substance, if not in legal
82
form.”
Peons, like indentured servants (and unlike slaves) were
subject to specific contractual obligations to a certain employer, who
83
was defined through a relationship of debt. The rights granted were
in personam with respect to that employer, not in rem rights
enforceable by other members of the community.
78. See Galenson, supra note 71, at 352-54 (noting that indentured servants were
bound to obey their master, who determined their work, living conditions,
treatment, and punishment for a contractually specified length of time that usually
ranged from four to ten or more years).
79. See, e.g., KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 208 (1956) (recounting that slaves were not to be educated, even
by their masters, but rather were to be manual laborers under the supervision of
white men); Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews, and the Constitution, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1315, 1340-43 (discussing slave codes that “prohibited slaves from marrying,
possessing firearms, learning to read and write, and suing their owners”); Wiecek,
supra note 25, at 1767-68 (discussing New York laws that prohibited, inter alia, slaves
from leaving the plantation without a pass).
80. One commentator refers to these restrictions on slave behavior as “public
rights,” similar in nature to an exercise of the police power. Thomas D. Russell, A
New Image of the Slave Auction: An Empirical Look at the Role of Law in Slave Sales and a
Conceptual Reevaluation of Slave Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 490-91 (1996).
“Viewed conceptually, slave property was not just a relationship between one
individual and a slave . . . Instead, slave property was also the legal relationship
among a number of non-slave individuals.” Id. at 480.
81. This conclusion dovetails with the statement by Hohfeld, perhaps the
premier scholar on the division between in rem and in personam rights, that the right
to bodily integrity was an in rem property right. See HOHFELD, supra note 40.
In addition, indentures were traditionally given in exchange for consideration,
while slavery was not. See supra note 72 (noting that indentures were generally given
in exchange for payment of the servant’s transportation to America). But cf.
Galenson, supra note 71 (noting that some indentures were imposed as part of a
criminal sentence).
82. Huq, supra note 73, at 359.
83. Id. at 379-80.
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Analysis of the laws of slavery also shows that they were derived
84
from English common law of property. The conclusion that slavery
was a property institution is supported by the treatment of slaves as
property in government transactions. For example, slaves were
auctioned in probate sales, which was standard treatment of a
85
decedent’s property, not his contracts.
b.

Self-purchase and voting

Two thorny issues remain which might weigh against classification
of slavery as a property institution: the existence of self-purchase,
which is allowing “property” to buy itself back; and the partial
counting of slaves for representation purposes. A small number of
slave owners allowed some of their slaves to save money towards selfpurchase. Slaves often earned this money by working for third
86
parties on weekends.
Self-purchase is certainly unusual in a property regime. However,
the phenomenon may have simply been an attempt to ameliorate
high supervision costs by giving slaves greater economic incentive to
87
work. There are also suggestions that the device was used to control
84. MORRIS, supra note 37, at 37-39, 104-07.
85. The auction of slaves showed that they were treated as property for the
purposes of legal title, which, from a positivist perspective, effectively ends the
question. See infra notes 240-241 and accompanying text (discussing slave sales at
probate auctions).
86. See John Cimprich, Self-Purchase, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY,
supra note 71, at 662 (stating that, while slaves technically worked solely for their
master’s benefit, workdays ended at dusk and did not include Sundays, so industrious
slaves could gain earnings from working overtime, performing odd jobs, and
producing domestic and agricultural goods during their free time).
87. See BARZEL, supra note 18, at 108-09 (finding that because a forced slave is
deprived of his or her entire net present value, owners faced a constant problem in
productivity because of the incentive to underwork). Barzel states that he does not
mean to imply endorsement of the racist critique that slaves were naturally indolent,
but rather, to suggest that slaves lacked the economic incentives that motivate other
workers to perform at higher levels. Id. at 107-11. A paid laborer can gain extra
wages for additional work, and thus has an incentive to work the number of hours
that is most economically efficient. However, slaves who are not allowed the
opportunity to self-purchase gain nothing for additional work, and so their incentive
is to work at the minimum required level. Id. at 109. See also Binder, supra note 34,
at 2087-88 (discussing self-purchase for the owner’s economic benefit).
This argument is probably incomplete. For example, masters and overseers often
punished slaves that they viewed as under-performing. In fact, oftentimes slaves
would overproduce to share their production with other slaves unable to meet
production requirements. However, it suggests one reason why self-purchase might
have existed; namely, “[i]n pursuit of their own self-interest, owners permitted slaves
to own and accumulate.” BARZEL, supra note 18, at 110. Barzel concludes that the
attempt “to lower the cost of supervision then included granting slaves the right to
part of the output or of their own time. The slaves, though legally their masters’
property, were able to accumulate wealth and occasionally to buy their own
contracts.” Id. at 113.
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and divide blacks. Regardless of the veracity of these assertions, the
restrictions on self-purchase indicate that it was less than a full
property right. Slaves had extremely limited protection for their self89
purchase savings. Even slaves who were able to self-purchase did not
have full access to the right of self-ownership. While slave owners
released property rights, the community did not; in rem rights were
not changed. In addition, even “freed” slaves were only free in
limited jurisdictions and could be captured and enslaved in other
90
jurisdictions. They were subject to onerous taxes designed to reduce
the free Black population, and if unable to pay, they could be sold
91
again into slavery.
The limited scope of self-purchase is thus
consistent with viewing slavery as a property institution.
The counting of slaves for purposes of representation is also
somewhat problematic. Gouverneur Morris, a delegate at the
Constitutional Convention, stated “Upon what principle is it that
slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then
make them Citizens & let them vote. Are they property? Why then is
92
no other property included?”
This critique points out that the
Southern states were willing to play fast and loose with the legal status
of slaves, insisting on treating them as property except when they saw
an advantage in doing otherwise. The unusual treatment of slaves in
93
the Three-Fifths Clause was the result of a political compromise.

88. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 149 (1974) (describing how
slaveowners used the promise of freedom to motive slaves to work harder and to be
more subservient); see also Binder, supra note 34, at 2089 (noting that, although many
slaveowners disliked free Blacks, the ability to set slaves free was an important tool
that slaveowners could use to their benefit).
89. See Jenny Bourne Wahl, Legal Constraints on Slave masters: The Problem of Social
Cost,41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 13 n.4 (1997) (discussing restrictions on contracts for
self-purchase); cf. Binder, supra note 34, at 2088 (finding that owners had some
economic incentive not to renege, so that they could sell manumission to other
slaves).
90. Cf. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 452-54 (1856) (finding that a slave does
not become free when the owner moves to a free state).
91. See Kevin Outterson, Slave Taxes, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at
135, 141 (stating how early in the eighteenth century the taxation differed little
between whites and slaves, but that immediately before the Revolution the use of
special taxes on free Blacks for discriminatory purposes began and quickly grew).
92. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 222 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). A similar statement was made by delegate Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts.
Arguing that “Blacks are property,” he demanded to know why Blacks’
representation should be increased because of the number of slaves. See Paul
Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery
Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 437 (1999) (discussing the process that lead to the
acceptance of the Three-Fifths Clause).
93. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 446-48 (noting that Northern legislators’
acceptance of the Three-Fifths Clause “was the beginning of a major compromise
between the deep South and the commercially oriented states of the North”).
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However, it does not change the fact that slaves were, as a general
94
matter, treated as property.
In sum, the existence of self-ownership and the practice of
counting slaves for representation are a bit unusual given slaves’
status as legal property; they do not change the categorization of
95
slavery as a property system.
2.

“Same government” requirement
A second element required for takings compensation is that the
taking be made by the government against whom the action is
96
brought. This element is most easily shown for takings incident to
slavery between 1808 and 1865. For acts during that time period,
there is an easily traceable line of authority connecting to modern
97
federal and state governments.
A greater problem arises in that many slave laws were enacted by
prior government entities. The origin of slavery in the colonies can
be traced to the seventeenth century, though the dates vary for
98
different colonies.
While many of the colonies were then
94. Of course, the slaves themselves were not granted representation, but were
simply used to calculate the representation of others; just as property requirements
determined the electorate. Property requirements for voting were a common part of
the political system set up at the founding of the nation. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 3,
at 580-85 (discussing how property restrictions were used after the Civil War in order
to limit the rights of Blacks); see also Sean Wilentz, Property and Power: Suffrage Reform
in the United States, 1787-1860, in VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 31-33 (Donald W.
Rogers & Christine Scriabine eds., 1992) (demonstrating how property restrictions
served a class-based function, giving more power to the propertied, theoretically to
prevent the poor from confiscating their property). For an example of a rejection of
these ideas by modern courts see Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15. 395 U.S. 621,
622 (1969) (overturning a property restriction statute that limited individuals who
were eligible to vote in school district elections to property owners and parents,
holding that such a property restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
95. As one commentator notes, “when push came to shove, the slave as property
clearly had priority over the slave as a person.” Russell, supra note 80, at 488
(internal quotations omitted).
96. This requirement derives from the language of the Takings Clause itself. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Epstein, supra note 11, at 19-20.
97. As suggested below, the passage of time should not immunize these
governments from takings liability. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1 (addressing
statutes of limitation issues).
98. Virginia imported its first slaves in 1619. MORRIS, supra note 37, at 3-4.
Between 1630 and 1660, Virginia courts began changing the sentences of Black
indentured servants. For crimes that would earn a whipping and additional years for
white indentured servants, Black indentured servants had their indenture extended
for life. Paul Finkelman, Law, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note
71, at 394. More restrictive laws were passed in the 1660s, and a statute was passed in
1670 that provided that non-Christian African servants “shall be slaves for their lives,”
while non-Christian Native American servants could gain their freedom after a
discreet time period. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 37. In 1680, Virginia formally
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possessions of England, slavery in some states can be traced to settlers
from other nations: Spain in Florida; Holland in New York and New
Jersey; and France in Louisiana and in the vast Louisiana Territory,
99
which was later divided into numerous states.
This raises the question of whether the United States can be held
responsible for acts performed before its inception. An argument
passed a slave code that established extensive restrictions on Blacks and was later
used as a model by other legislatures. Id. at 39.
Maryland converted Black indentured servants into slaves in 1639, and removed
their right to be free as Christians in 1644. Elbert B. Smith, Slavery in Maryland, in
DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 440; see also Wiecek, supra
note 25, at 1761 (arguing that the rights of Blacks declined gradually between 1634
and 1664).
North Carolina and South Carolina began as a single colony of Carolina. Wiecek,
supra note 25, at 1768; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 153. The colony’s
proprietors issued the Fundamental Constitution of Carolina, authored by John
Locke in 1669-1670; this document explicitly provided for slavery. Wiecek, supra
note 25, at 1768-70; HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 151-52; Jeffrey J. Crow, Slavery
in North Carolina, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 537.
North Carolina’s first slave code was enacted in 1715. Id. at 539. The South Carolina
legislature first attempted to pass a slave law in 1690, but that law was struck down.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 169. The first comprehensive slave code was passed
in 1712. Id.
Georgia was late to adopt slavery—it was even prohibited during its early history.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 216-17; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771-73. However,
the prohibition was laxly enforced. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 227-37. In any
event, the prohibition of slavery proved economically unfeasible, and the legislature
adopted a slave code in 1750. Id. at 216-17; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1772.
In 1641, Massachusetts adopted legislation—the first such legislation—allowing for
slavery. Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1742-44. Later legislation further strengthened the
institution, although it was never particularly important in Massachusetts. Id. at
1744-46; see also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 84 (noting the passage of laws
equating Blacks with property). Connecticut also began the use of slaves around this
time. Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1743-44.
Rhode Island never adopted legislation allowing slavery, and in fact appears to
have been legally bound by a 1652 proclamation of Providence and Warwick
(predating the colony’s 1663 charter) banning slavery. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note
18, at 459 n.3; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1746-47. The ban was never enforced, and
Rhode Island imported large numbers of slaves by the eighteenth century. Id.
New York began as a Dutch colony and was part of the slave trade by 1626.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 101; Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1763-64. English
conquest changed legal rules, but maintained the institution of slavery. Wiecek,
supra note 25, at 1764-68. In fact, the Duke of York, with a financial interest in the
Royal African Company, actively encouraged the slave trade. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 18, at 114. New York adopted laws in 1665, a year after its annexation by the
English, that recognized and extensively regulated slavery. Id. at 115.
Present-day New Jersey covers the area originally governed under more than one
colonial government. The Dutch portion originally followed the same law as New
York. Id. at 101. While a Quaker portion resisted slavery for some time, the entire
united colony adopted a slave code in 1713. Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771.
Pennsylvania and Delaware were a single colony until 1701. Slavery existed under
the Duke of York’s laws prior to the division of the colonies. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 18, at 270; see also id. at 267-99 (discussing slavery in the Pennsylvania and
Delaware area). After the colonies were divided, slave codes were established in
Delaware in 1721 and Pennsylvania in 1725. Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1771.
99. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1773-90.
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could be made that any debt to slaves for the confiscation of their
self-ownership would adhere to the original European powers that
controlled the colonies at the time laws allowing slavery were passed.
The stronger argument, however, is that the United States assumed
those obligations when the colonies won their independence. Great
Britain, upon signing the Treaty of Paris with United States, released
100
all of “propriety and territorial rights” of the United States.
As
Chief Justice Marshall noted, “[b]y this treaty, the powers of
government, and the right to soil, which had previously been in Great
101
Britain, passed definitively to these States.” The United States was
treated as a successor state to the colonies, not unlike a corporate
102
successor, and inherited both assets and liabilities.
Even though the United States may be deemed to have succeeded
to the colonies’ liabilities, potential federalism problems exist that
could arguably prevent the federal government from being held
liable. The federal government did not enact the laws creating
slavery. Rather, they were enacted by a number of state governments
103
and their precursors.
The Takings Clause, like other portions of
104
the Bill of Rights, originally applied only to the federal government.
100. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His
Britannic Majesty, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, 8 Stat. 80, 81.
101. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584 (1823).
102. Cf. Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?, 23 DENV. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 11-17 (1994) (discussing the legal effect of numerous state
secessions and separations outside the United States); see also Brief of Amici Curiae of
the States of Montana et al., in Support of Petitioners, Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001) (No. 99-1994) (discussing which attributes of sovereignty were passed from
Britain to the United States at independence). Presumably, the same would apply to
colonies, which were inherited from France, Holland, and Spain, due to treaties with
those countries. This obligation would apply only to slave laws in the area that later
became the United States. For example, if a person was enslaved in a French colony
in Africa, and subsequently transported to a French colony in Louisiana, the United
States would be responsible for the enslaving act in Louisiana, not the one in Africa.
The original enslavement in Africa is not “binding.” Because the slave’s selfownership is inalienable, he is continuously re-enslaved by the laws allowing slavery,
and since this re-enslavement is never valid, it is always repeated again the next day.
The case for successor liability is especially strong where, as in this case, the
liabilities spring from actions that have contributed to the creation of the inherited
assets. Laws allowing slavery enhanced the colonial economies, through commerce,
agriculture, and taxation, as set out, supra notes 231-245.
103. See supra note 98 (chronicling the passage of laws allowing slavery in different
colonies).
104. The Bill of Rights was gradually incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 215-30 (1998); FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 65 (stating that, for most
of the 1800s, federal courts applied the Bill of Rights against the federal government
and not the states). “If citizens wanted to prevent state legislative infringements on
property, they had to word their own constitutions accordingly.” Id. Interestingly,
the Takings Clause was the first part of the Bill of Rights to be incorporated. Id. at
66.
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The partial overlap between state and federal takings clauses
105
Many states had individual
mitigates the federalism problem.
106
takings clauses, under which they might be liable for compensation.
In addition, the federal government participated in slavery by
protecting the slave trade and enforcing claims on slave ownership
107
between states.
Slavery in the District of Columbia was directly
108
subject to federal regulations.
Federal laws were indispensable in
effectuating the taking; the federal government’s exercise of its
commerce power allowed the states to continue the taking of slaves’
self-ownership property rights. Slavery was dependent on a system of
contracts that were enforced through the Contracts Clause of the
109
Thus, the federal government’s participation in
Constitution.
slavery makes it liable for compensation.
B. Existence of a Taking: The Types of Takings Involved
Section A concluded that slavery was a system of property and that
the current government of the United States is implicitly responsible
for such system. Takings jurisprudence recognizes the categories of
physical takings and regulatory takings. This Section examines how
slavery fits within those categories, and how it might fit within other
theoretical categories.
1.

Physical takings
Physical takings involve the appropriation of title to property or the
confiscation of one or more of the “sticks” from the “bundle of sticks”
110
For example,
that comprise the property owner’s interest.
government imposition of an easement or a right of passage will
111
trigger the Takings Clause.
Although title may remain with the
owner, the government has removed valuable sticks from the
112
bundle.
105. See id. at 65-66.
106. See Fischel, supra note 11, at 65-66.
107. Paul Finkelman, Essay, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained,
13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 413, 437-44 (2001) (discussing federal involvement in slavery).
108. See Henry S. Robinson, Slavery in the District of Columbia, in DICTIONARY OF
AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 192-93.
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts”); see Alfred Brophy, Note, Let Us Go Back and Stand Upon
the Constitution: Federal-State Relations in Scott v. Sandford, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 192, 221
(1990) (stating that the Contracts Clause might be used to maintain slavery once it
had been established in a territory, even if the territory later became a free state).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (describing the
common idiom “bundle of sticks” as a collection of individual rights which, in certain
combinations, constitute property).
111. Id. at 296 n.5.
112. Id. But cf. Merrill, supra note 63, at 906 (noting that dividing a bundle of
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It is unlikely that actual title to a slave’s property right of selfownership was transferred to the government, especially given the
inalienable nature of that property right. What is certain is that
nearly all of the sticks from the bundle—for example, liberty, family
integrity, and enjoyment of labor—were confiscated.
That
confiscation resulted in a physical taking, that is, removal of effective
title to property.
2.

Regulatory takings
Slavery also fits easily within the regulatory takings framework. The
regulatory takings doctrine allows compensation for regulations that
113
deprive an owner of a substantial amount of property value. These
types of takings were first recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
114
Mahon, in which Justice Holmes stated, “if regulation goes too far it
115
The idea has remained largely
will be recognized as a taking.”
unchanged since its inception.
One commentator recently
summarized the doctrine; “there are some regulatory schemes so
close in spirit to eminent domain that they must be regarded as
116
takings.” The Supreme Court has eschewed any categorical rule in
the area, instead finding that the test for a regulation which “goes too
117
far” is to be factual and ad hoc.
A requisite for all compensable regulatory takings is a regulation
118
that affects property interests.
In the case of slavery, the
requirement of a regulation is met. The origin of slavery in the
colonies began with legislation passed mostly in the seventeenth
119
century.
The adoption of slavery was an affirmative step taken by
120
the colonies since slavery was virtually non-existent in England.
property rights into several “discreet assets” could limit the viability of further
“conceptual severance” of the rights associated with those assets).
113. See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11 (exploring regulatory takings from both an
economic and a legal point of view).
114. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
115. Id. at 415.
116. FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 59.
117. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 326 (2002) (concluding that the courts should resist the temptation to adopt per
se rules in cases involving partial regulatory takings, choosing instead to examine a
number of factors rather than a simple mathematically precise formula).
118. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (proclaiming that an
ordinance affecting a property interest is a taking if it “does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests”).
119. See supra note 98.
120. See Wiecek, supra note 25, at 1715-25 (discussing the lack of slavery in English
tradition); see also DAVID LYONS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL JUNCTURES IN U.S.
HISTORY AND THEIR LEGACY 6 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 02-06, 2002) (stating that the legal institution of chattel slavery
did not exist through most of the seventeenth century, but was constructed during
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The colonies passed statutes that created slavery as an institution and
allowed for the children of female slaves to be born into slave
121
status. This move was a conscious decision by political leaders who
122
understood the alternatives and sought to benefit from slavery.
After slavery was adopted, governments became actively involved in
its regulation, taxation, and execution.
Government actors
conducted a large percentage of slave auctions, allowing neutral
devices such as probate and the seizure of debtors’ assets to become
123
State governments passed regulations
part of the slave trade.
124
facilitating the recapture of escaped slaves. There is even a Fugitive
125
Along with the laws
Slave Clause enshrined in the Constitution.
originally establishing slavery, fugitive slave laws and slave trade
regulations show a pattern of regulation linked to the taking of slaves’
126
self-ownership. The express language of the Fugitive Slave Clause—
that slaves from each state were held “under the Laws thereof”—

the later decades of the seventeenth century by those who ruled the colony of
Virginia),
available
at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/
pdf_files/LyonsD061702.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
121. See supra note 98 (discussing the adoption of laws allowing slavery in the
colonies).
122. Colonial leaders sought to achieve political benefits by racializing slavery; by
forcing slaves to the bottom of the color-coded social system, they accorded greater
privilege and opportunity to those on the second tier. See LYONS, supra note 120, at
15.
123. See infra notes 231-245 and accompanying text (discussing government
involvement in and benefits from the slave market).
124. See MORRIS, supra note 37, at 340-46 (discussing fugitive slave laws).
125. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due”).
126. In addition to analyzing regulations that established slavery, and confiscated
slaves’ self-ownership, under a standard regulatory takings analysis it is also possible
to characterize them as laws creating easements. This easement did not destroy the
property interest of the slaves (their bodies) because to do so would be
counterproductive; rather, it granted to others (owners) the right to use that
property interest. Forced easements are compensable under the Takings Clause.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(authorizing compensation in a case involving a television cable easement); Griggs v.
Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1962) (finding that homeowners were owed
just compensation as a result of an over-flight easement); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 262-63 (1946) (compensating landowners for damages to property
resulting from an over-flight easement). See generally FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 57-59
(noting cases whereby easements as takings called for appropriate compensation).
Alternatively, slavery could be considered a system of zoning. Slaves’ selfownership was improperly “zoned” to be takeable by others. Zoning regulations that
are overly intrusive are also compensable. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1011-12 (1992) (holding that some deprivations of use are compensable under
the Takings Clause).
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underscores that slavery was a creature of law and regulation,
127
imposed over a baseline of freedom for all persons.
The regulatory framework established by governments to facilitate
slavery meets the requirement of regulatory action by the
government. This regulation is also one that “goes too far” under the
128
tests proposed by Mahon and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
129
York City.
The regulation destroys all value that the original
property holder had in the property, rendering self-ownership
worthless by transferring ownership rights to other parties. The
severity of the regulation is tantamount to “obliteration of value” of
130
the property and removes “all economically beneficial uses” for it.
Slavery thus meets the definition of a regulatory taking.
3.

Alternative takings theories: Derivative takings and givings
In addition to the comparatively well-settled areas of physical
takings and regulatory takings, scholars have argued for the
compensation other types of takings, such as derivative takings and
givings.
The idea behind derivative takings is that an original taking, while
compensable to the owner of that property, may cause additional
131
harm to third parties.
A derivative taking results from either a
physical taking or a regulatory taking and occurs when the original
132
taking reduces the value of surrounding property. Several scholars
argue that such consequential damages should be compensable
under the Takings Clause, that their exclusion from the losses
awarded in takings cases is not defensible, and that their inclusion
would force the state to consider and to bear the full costs of its

127. See Binder, supra note 34, at 2077-78 (“Anglo-American jurisprudence . . .
assumed that slavery violated natural law and could only be established by positive
law.”).
128. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922) (describing the
contours of the regulatory taking doctrine and restating the general rule that while
property may be regulated by the government, regulations that go “too far” will be
deemed a compensable taking).
129. See 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1978) (noting the factors that guide a
determination of whether a particular regulation constitutes a taking to include the
economic impact of the regulation and the character of the government action).
130. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010, 1019 (holding that where a state seeks to sustain a
regulation that deprives land of “all economically beneficial use,” it may resist
compensation only if the inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate showed that
the proscribed use was not part of the owner’s title to begin with).
131. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 280 (observing that, although the
government compensates owners of property subject to the original taking, equallyharmed owners of surrounding property are not compensated for their diminished
property values).
132. Id. at 280-81.
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133

actions.
Consequently, a state would be encouraged to use its
eminent domain power only when such use will enhance social
134
utility. Proponents further argue that a policy of not compensating
derivative takings cannot be justified on either efficiency grounds or
135
fairness grounds.
Courts, however, have consistently rejected
136
derivative takings claims.
In the case of slavery, the derivative harm is plain—slavery has led
to institutionalized racism in society, a continuing harm to slave
137
descendants.
The comparative disadvantages of racial minorities,
including Blacks, are well documented. According to recent census
figures, 22% of Blacks lived in poverty in 2000, compared with 9.4%
138
of whites.
Disadvantages also appear in education statistics, where
133. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 52 (arguing that the Takings Clause was
meant to protect the owner of the item taken, not the item itself, and as such
consequential damages should be recoverable).
134. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 15, at 282-83 (suggesting a takings
compensation program that would promote truthful takings claims against the
government, prevent overpayment by the government for its takings, and, as such,
result in an economically efficient takings regime).
135. See id. at 290-93 (stating that without a policy of compensation, the
government may act inefficiently by failing to consider total net costs, or unfairly by
failing to consider whether the costs of its actions disproportionately burden certain
members of the public). But see Treanor, supra note 11, at 859 (commenting that
under the original understanding of the Takings Clause, the government did not
owe compensation for property not physically taken, no matter how severely its
actions affected the value of the property).
136. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 52 (noting that courts uniformly deny
consequential damages in eminent domain cases on the theory that the government
did not take the consequentially lost items). The most well-known case is United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), in which the Supreme Court awarded damages
to homeowners whose property lay directly below the air routes of military jets, but
not to other property owners who suffered nearly identical damage but were not
directly overflown by the government planes. Id. at 260-62.
137. See KEITH N. HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT LAW 30 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-02, 2003) (arguing that slavery led to
racism by giving racist beliefs an economic component), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK012803.pdf (on file with
the American University Law Review); see also LYONS, supra note 120, at 41-43
(suggesting that the social programs enacted in the 1900s failed to correct the legacy
of inequalities resulting from 350 years of slavery and Jim Crow laws). This harm also
stems in part from the politically-motivated failure to meet the promises of
Reconstruction. See id. at 26-30 (stating that the Hayes-Tilden Agreement of 1877,
which handed the presidential election to the Republicans in exchange for an end to
the federal government’s oversight of freed Black’s rights, ended Reconstruction and
led to the exclusion of Blacks from political participation).
Note that racism also affects other minority groups. The question of whether
other minority groups could seek Takings Clause compensation, based on the taking
of slaves’ self-ownership or on other takings, is beyond the scope of this Article.
138. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES, TABLE 5: PERCENT
OF PEOPLE IN POVERTY, BY DEFINITION OF INCOME AND SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2000,
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/poverty00/table5.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
The table contains different figures for different definitions of poverty. Other
definitions vary somewhat in the numbers they produce, but consistently place Blacks
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74.9% of adult Blacks have a high-school diploma or more, compared
with 86.2% of whites; 13.3% have a college bachelor’s degree or
139
more, compared with 26.2% of whites. Black per capita income in
1998 was just above half of white per capita income, a ratio that has
140
remained largely unchanged for at least thirty years. Black median
family income in 1998 was $29,404; white median family income was
141
$49,023.
The number of Blacks below the poverty level has
decreased during the past three decades as a percentage of the Black
population, from 33.5% in 1970 to 23.6% in 1998, while the number
of whites below the poverty level held fast at about 10% throughout
142
that time.
Black males had an incarceration rate in 1999 eight
143
Department of Justice statistics
times higher than white males.
show that in 1997 Blacks as a whole had a 16.2% chance of going to
144
prison in their lifetime, compared with a 2.5% chance for whites.
Among homicide defendants, the chances that a Black defendant will
be charged with a capital crime and receive the death penalty
145
continue to rise. According to Department of Justice figures from
at a significantly higher level of poverty than whites. For example, when poverty is
defined as income less taxes plus capital gains or losses without EIC, 10.5% of whites
are under the poverty level, compared to 24.0% of Blacks. Id. Similarly, when
poverty is defined as income less taxes plus capital gains or losses with EIC, 9.1% of
whites are below the poverty level, compared to 21.1% of Blacks. Id. See also
Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 18, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp.,
No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (citing a census report showing that in 1998
in the United States, 26% of Blacks lived in poverty compared to 8% of whites),
available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/02cv1862cmp.pdf (on file with the
American University Law Review); CHUCK COLLINS & FELICE YESKEL, ECONOMIC
APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND INSECURITY 43-46
(2000) (demonstrating that income inequality has widened more drastically among
Blacks than among whites).
139. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, TABLE 7: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF PERSONS
25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, REGION, AND RACE:
MARCH 1997, at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/black/tabs97/tab07.txt
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). The FarmerPaellmann suit lists slightly different figures for 1998, finding that 14.7% of African
Americans had four-year college degrees, compared with 25% of whites. Complaint
and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 18, Farmer-Paellmann (No. CV-02-1862).
140. See THE NEW YORK TIMES 2001 ALMANAC 319 (John W. Wright ed., 2001)
(listing Black per capita income in 1998 as $12,957, and white per capita income in
1998 as $21,394).
141. Id.
142. Id. (containing percentages for whites below the poverty line ranging
between 9.8% and 11.4% for the years between 1970 and 1999).
143. See id. at 310 (noting incarceration rates, in prisoners per 100,000 resident
population, of 3,408 for Black males and 417 for white males).
144. Id. at 312. The statistics for males are more dramatic—Black males have a
28.5% chance of going to prison, while white males have a 4.4% chance. Id.
145. See Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas
Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 779, 782 (2002) (summarizing evidence that the
death penalty is disproportionately applied to Blacks and finding that states with
larger Black populations are under more political pressure to seek the death
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2000, Black women were fifteen percent more likely than white
women to be victims of crimes of violence other than murder; Black
146
men were thirty-six percent more likely than white men.
As one lawsuit succinctly sums up the gloomy picture, Blacks “lag
behind whites according to every social yardstick: literacy, life
147
expectancy, income, and education.”
These disparities can be
148
linked to the legacy of slavery. Since the time of slavery, society has
reinforced a presumption that Blacks are inferior, unintelligent, or
149
They are a modern manifestation of an invidious right
criminal.
150
created by society through slavery, the right of “white privilege.” As
penalty). Of the people on death row today, forty-three percent are Black and over
one-half are people of color. Id. at 779 n.33.
146. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES,
2000 STATISTICAL TABLES, Table 6 (2002) (finding rates for crimes of violence, per
1,000 persons age 12 and over, to be 28.5% for Black women, 22.7% for white
women, 43.4% for Black men, and 31.8% for white men), at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus0001.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review); see also LISA D. BASTAIN & BRUCE M. TAYLOR, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, YOUNG BLACK MALE VICTIMS (1994) (finding that young
Black males have approximately a 150% greater chance of being a victim of violent
crime than young white males), available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/ygbkml.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
147. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 19, Farmer-Paellmann (No. CV-02-1862).
148. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 74 (stating that slavery and its aftereffects,
including the disparate position in which newly freed slaves found themselves in the
years following slavery, made it unrealistic that future generations of Blacks and
whites would find themselves on equal footing); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE
PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 126-29 (2002) (suggesting that
problems in and expectations among the African American family unit can be
attributed to slavery); Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 61-62 (discussing some of the
continuing effects of slavery); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE
RACIAL DIVIDE: RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS 12-23, 33-39 (1999)
(analyzing the role of race and racism in economic inequality); Chisolm, supra note
5, at 687-89 (indicating that statistical inequalities between Blacks and whites relate
to past patterns of discrimination).
149. Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2063-70 (1993)
(discussing how slavery led to societal associations of crime with Blacks).
150. See PEGGY MCINTOSH, WHITE PRIVILEGE AND MALE PRIVILEGE: A PERSONAL
ACCOUNT OF COMING TO SEE CORRESPONDENCES THROUGH WORK IN WOMEN’S STUDIES
10-11 (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988)
(describing white privilege as “conditions of daily experience” which afford
advantages to whites); Robert Jensen, White Privilege Shapes the United States, BALT. SUN,
July 19, 1998 at 1C (acknowledging the existence of white privilege as an unearned
privilege experienced by all white people to varying extents); see also Jerome
McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1637, 165960, 1664 (1999) (discussing white privilege and the influential effect of white
perspectives on the law and legal academia).
The existence of white privilege serves as a justification for reparations even in
cases of later immigrants or other non-slaveowners. See Molly Secours, Riding the
Reparations Bandwagon, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 286, 287-88 (finding
that benefits of white privilege are conferred on all white individuals, regardless of
whether or not their families previously owned slaves); Van Dyke, supra note 20, at
72-73 (stating that white people, in general, incur substantial benefits from the
existence of white privilege).
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such, these disparities are derivative harms stemming from the
original taking. If one believes that it is proper to compensate
151
derivative takings, then slavery looks compensable.
A related argument based on derivative harms is that although
original takings victims are no longer alive, their heirs may pursue the
original victims’ claims because the government deprived the original
victims of the right to bring the claim. The heirs may appropriately
bring such claims because the original taking affects their own social
152
and educational opportunities.
Although the passage of time and
the imperfect connections between slaves and their heirs, or in some
cases the lack of any connection to slave ancestors, somewhat weaken
the argument that modern Blacks are the appropriate heirs of slaves,
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that this connection
problem should be overlooked because, “the stigma of slavery
attaches only to people who are perceived to be black and not to
153
nonblacks.”
This stigma of inferiority is related to societal racism,
154
Under this argument, modern
which in turn is linked to slavery.
Blacks are the appropriate heirs of slaves and, even if some are not
direct heirs, they are the derivatively-harmed party for takings
analysis.
A similar argument can be made using givings analysis. Givings
theory argues that where government action unfairly rewards one
155
party, that party should be required to reimburse the government.
Although no courts have adopted this model, it has strong intuitive
appeal: arbitrary or capricious givings to one party are similar to the
arbitrary and capricious takings, which led to the adoption of the
Takings Clause.
Since whites enjoy greater income, educational opportunities, and
156
employment opportunities than Blacks, a givings analysis applied to
slavery would hold that the advantages of non-Africans evidence a
151. But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108-10 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
plaintiff’s claim in reparations context where plaintiff sought damages for the
continued discrimination stemming from the enslavement of African Americans).
152. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
continuing effects of slavery, including economic inequalities and the disparities
associated with white privilege).
153. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 708 (2003).
154. Finkelman, supra note 149, at 2063-70.
155. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 574-80 (stating that a giving occurs
when the government bestows a benefit upon someone, such as a change in zoning
laws that increases property values, but when such a benefit is inequitably given, the
government should assess charges against the recipient).
156. See supra notes 134-147 and accompanying text (discussing statistics regarding
income, educational, incarceration, and employment disparities).
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“giving” to non-slaves and their descendants. This giving is still
occurring, and under givings analysis, should be taxed. A tax on a
giving could have largely the same effect as remuneration for a
157
taking.
Of course, arguments involving derivative takings or givings are
risky, primarily because courts have not yet approved these
arguments. However, despite their lack of a strong legal foundation
at present, these arguments are nevertheless valuable. First, slavery
may prove a sufficiently compelling example for courts to accept
these theories as a basis for compensation. Second, by making these
arguments, reparations advocates can gain valuable allies by bringing
takings scholars into the reparations fold. Finally, such arguments
provide broader appeal for courts—traditional tort-based reparations
arguments can appeal to liberal judges, while takings-based
arguments may appeal to conservative judges.
III. SLAVERY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
This Part examines whether the Constitution endorses slavery and
how any constitutional endorsement might affect slaves’ takings
claims, viewed in light of the purpose of the Takings Clause. Section
A discusses the purpose of the Takings Clause. Section B addresses
constitutional text and history that could represent an endorsement
of slavery. Section C analyzes how to avoid the negative results of any
constitutional endorsement.
A. Purpose of the Takings Clause
This Section briefly analyzes three of the leading theories that
describe the purpose of the Takings Clause. Each theory is evaluated
to determine whether compensation for slavery is consistent with that
theory. It finds each theory consistent with takings compensation for
slavery.
1.

Libertarianism: Richard Epstein
Richard Epstein, perhaps the most prominent expositor of the
Takings Clause, has argued that many government acts—including
158
most taxes—ought to be compensable under the Takings Clause.
157. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 11, at 591-93, 597-600 (commenting on
the appropriateness of a givings tax where the opposite action would result in a
compensable taking and analyzing the means for computing and levying such taxes).
158. See EPSTEIN, supra note 11, passim. This relatively hands-off approach is often
characterized as libertarian. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Marion Schwartzchild, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Libertarianism and Utilitarianism, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
657, 657-59 (2000).
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Epstein argues that the clause exists “to guarantee a proportionate
distribution of the gain among all of the parties from whom the
159
Like a private actor, the
government takes private property.”
government must be held accountable for harms it inflicts on parties
for its own good—where private parties are subject to tort law, the
160
government is subject to takings limitations.
Noting that property
can be viewed as a bundle of rights, Epstein argues that “partial
161
takings” of any of that bundle ought to be compensated.
Epstein
also contends that, “[t]he greater the numbers [of takings victims],
162
the greater the wrong.”
Using Epstein’s approach, the taking of slaves’ self-ownership looks
like a compensable taking. If the Takings Clause is designed to
equitably distribute the gain from society’s decisions to confiscate
property, then slaves should receive their portion of the gain from
the confiscation of their self-ownership; that is, compensation to
offset the harm they have suffered and to bring them in line with the
rest of the populace. Epstein’s arguments for compensation for a
partial taking of any of the bundle of property rights also weigh in
slaves’ favor—slaves certainly suffered at least a partial taking when
their property right to quiet enjoyment was confiscated. His belief
that the greater the scope of the takings, the greater the wrong, also
suggests that slavery, and its mass confiscation of self-ownership,
163
ought to be compensable.
2.

Historical analysis: William Treanor
William Treanor argues that James Madison, who bears most of the
164
responsibility for the Takings Clause, deliberately chose not to
165
Madison intentionally limited the
protect non-physical property.
159. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 15.
160. See id. at 36-39 (discussing the need for compensation by analogy to private
law).
161. See id. at 60-62 (arguing that the “partial loss of single incidents may
determine the measure of damages but may not negate the taking”).
162. Id. at 94.
163. Epstein’s other writings suggest a belief that slavery was a confiscation of selfownership. He writes that “slavery is the antithesis of the system of self-ownership on
which any sensible property right rests. Its abolition should be regarded as a
restoration of property rights.” Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of Takings
Law: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 955, 977
(1993). However, Epstein has written that Indian and slave claims may be blocked
due to statutes of limitation. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 346-50. As this Article argues,
that analysis does not apply to slavery since statutes of limitation should not apply to
this taking. See infra Part IV.B.1.
164. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-55 (commenting on Madison’s support of
the principles that appear in the Takings Clause such as concern for protection of
land property from majoritarian rule).
165. See generally id. at 836-55 (discussing Madison’s views of the Takings Clause
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clause’s scope because he believed that the legislature was best
equipped to deal with regulatory intrusions and that the Constitution
166
Constitutional
adequately protected against such intrusions.
protection was required only for certain physical takings, including
the takings of land from property holders or of slaves from slave
167
owners. This was primarily because physical property takings were
168
especially vulnerable to failures of the political process.
Treanor
suggests that in today’s society, compensation should also be given for
169
environmental takings aimed at discreet and insular minorities.
Application of Treanor’s tests to slavery results in a mixed bag.
The taking of slaves’ self-ownership rights was neither an
appropriation of physical property, nor one of Treanor’s narrowly
defined exceptions for regulatory takings. Treanor’s belief that
slaveowners’ rights were protected could suggest non-acceptance of
compensation for slaves. On the other hand, slaves’ control over
their bodies—one of the “bundle of sticks” constituting physical
property ownership—was taken. As argued above, slaveowners’
170
control of slaves constituted a physical taking, thereby satisfying
Treanor’s test. In addition, because the political process certainly did
not adequately consider slaves’ property claims of self-ownership
fairly, slaves’ claims seem to fall under one of Treanor’s tests, namely

and suggesting that constitutional protections for property rights was initially limited
to takings of physical property in order to protect against majoritarian confiscation
of land and slaves).
166. See id. at 841-42 (recognizing Madison’s belief that the checks and balances
system could sufficiently protect property interests); see also Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1087
(1999) (stating that prior to the ratification of the Takings Clause as part of the Fifth
Amendment, the Constitution already reflected the principles underlying the
Takings Clause; namely, compensation for government appropriations of property).
167. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-54 (detailing Madison’s belief that the
potential for population expansion and future majoritarian decisionmaking meant
that ownership of land and slaves required additional protection).
168. Id. at 854; see id. at 827-34, 836 (discussing the adoption of state takings
clauses prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and concluding that their adoption
resulted from specific process failures involving land held by politically vulnerable
groups). The background understanding of the Takings Clause, coupled with the
Framers’ and ratifiers’ intents, indicate that the Takings Clause was designed to
require compensation where political process failures threatened to consider
property claims, and their attendant consequences on the economic well-being of
the property owners, unfairly. Id. at 854-55.
169. See id. at 873-77 (describing environmental racism as the likelihood that
minority communities will receive a disproportionately high number of hazardous
waste sites due to such communities’ lack of political advantage, therefore justifying
the application of the Takings Clause to such environmental justice cases).
170. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text (recognizing that property
consists of a collection of individual rights, a concept that supports the argument
that slaves suffered a physical taking).
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that majoritarian decisionmakers have not evidenced a history of fair
171
consideration of property claims.
3.

Economic and philosophical approach: Frank Michelman
Frank Michelman argues that the Takings Clause offers a way to
turn Kaldor-Hicks transactions—those that increase total societal
wealth but decrease the wealth of particular parties—into Pareto
172
Michelman
superior transactions—those that benefit all parties.
argues that takings can be evaluated under either a fairness or a
utility analysis. Both Michelman’s utility analysis and his fairness
173
analysis support arguments favoring compensation for slavery.
a.

Michelman’s utilitarian analysis

Under a utilitarian analysis, compensation is appropriate where the
“demoralization cost” of an action—the negative effect on total utility
that occurs if the action invades property rights and upsets
investment and property expectations—is greater than the cost of
174
According to Michelman, it is appropriate to
compensation.
compensate the victims of the takings because the “risk of
majoritarian exploitation” creates greater disincentives for parties to
contribute to society than do naturally occurring risks, such as
175
earthquakes and plague.
Even larger demoralization costs may be
suitable under circumstances where “capricious” majoritarian
176
behavior is involved; where societal actions cause disproportionate
177
burdens to fall on particular parties; and where actions tend to
178
channel benefits and burdens to different groups of people.
Slavery satisfies many, if not all, of these criteria. Slavery, because it
involves the designation of members of a minority race for
confiscation of their property right of self-ownership, appears to be a
171. See Treanor, supra note 11.
172. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1176-78 (discussing the economics of
efficiency). See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-17 (5th ed.
1998) (explaining the relationship between Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).
173. Michelman notes that fairness analysis and utilitarian analysis often, though
not always, reach the same result. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1223-24.
174. See id. at 1215 (noting the emergence of a rule making compensation
mandatory in situations in which demoralization costs and efficiency gains exceed
settlement costs).
175. Id. at 1216-17.
176. Id. at 1217 (“Capricious distributions will not be tolerated, even as accidental
adjuncts of efficiency-dictated measure, when compensation settlements can be
reached without much trouble . . . .”).
177. Id. at 1217 (“The clearer it is that the claimant has sustained an injury distinct
from those sustained by the generality of persons in society . . . the more compelling
will his claim to compensation become.”).
178. Id. at 1218.
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“majoritarian exploitation” of a powerless minority group. The use of
179
The
race as a classification could be considered capricious.
confiscation of self-ownership involved in slavery caused a
disproportionate burden, both in absolute and in relative terms, to
fall on a few select parties. Those parties lost all, or nearly all, of their
self-ownership, which was an unusually important property interest
for them. Finally, the taking of slavery channeled benefits to one
group of people—landowners, slave owners, and traders—while
180
allocating burdens to a different group. Thus, under Michelman’s
utilitarian analysis takings compensation for enslaved persons would
be justified.
b.

Michelman’s fairness analysis

Compensation is also appropriate if a redistribution is not “fair”
181
under a Rawlsian fairness analysis. Redistribution which “impair[s]
182
Michelman suggests
liberties unequally” requires compensation.
that compensation is required to achieve fairness under certain
circumstances, including situations in which one party suffers an
“unusually great” harm or in cases lacking “visible reciprocities of
183
burden and benefit.”

179. Observers during the time of slavery, however, may have felt differently.
Their sentiments likely would depend on how confident they were that takings
involving the confiscation of self-ownership would not be imposed on them. To the
extent that they felt that these types of takings were safely limited along racial lines,
these observers would have been secure in their investment-backed expectations that
such takings would not be imposed against them, and so they would not consider the
takings “capricious” for their utilitarian purposes.
180. Any benefit slaves received from their forced labor, such as being able to eat
some of the crops they grew, was incidental to the benefit their owners reaped from
their labor, and would be of minimal weight when calculating benefit and harm. See
infra Section IV.A.2 (noting that slaves were not compensated).
181. Michelman employs John Rawls’s definition of fairness. Rawls considers
actions fair if they either accord no preferences to any party, or if they allow for
disparities in treatment only in situations where all relevant parties could potentially
be advantaged or disadvantaged, and the arrangement could reasonably benefit
every participant. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1219 (citing John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958), reprinted in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY 80
(Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961); John Rawls, Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of
Justice, in NOMOS VI: JUSTICE (C. Friedrich & J. Chapman eds., 1963; John Rawls,
Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 281 (1963)).
182. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1221. The investigation under both the fairness
and utilitarian analysis is to be long-term, with societal impositions viewed as
evidence of trends or tendencies. Impositions in the name of efficiency are thus
permitted where “the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such
decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run risk
to people like him than would any consistent practice which is naturally suggested by
the opposite decision.” Id. at 1223.
183. Id.
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Michelman’s fairness analysis, which is based on many of the same
factors as the utilitarian analysis, unsurprisingly results in a similar
184
Fairness analysis suggests that compensation is
outcome.
appropriate where, among other things, a societal taking “has the
185
effect of impairing liberties unequally”;
where applicants are
unlikely to agree, in the long term, that such takings functioned as
part of a consistent practice that is less risky for groups to which they
belong than a contrary practice would be; where harm is
disproportionately focused on certain individuals; or where “visible
186
reciprocities of burden and benefit” are not present.
Slavery is a taking that concentrates harm on certain individuals.
There is no reciprocity in this taking. The benefits accrue to one set
of actors, while another set suffers the harm. Slavery thus has the
187
effect of “impairing liberties unequally” over the long term.
Therefore, takings compensation for slavery seems appropriate under
Michelman’s fairness analysis, just as it is under his utilitarian analysis.
4.

Other commentators’ explanations
There are other theories about the Takings Clause’s purpose that
will not be fully examined here because of space constraints. A quick
survey of other scholars, however, shows support for principles
compatible with takings compensation for slavery.
Joseph Sax, for example, argues that government should be
required to compensate injured parties when it confiscates property
188
to increase its wealth, rather than to arbitrate disputes.
William
Fischel suggests compensation is appropriate for property owners
who lack a voice in the political process and are forced to endure
regulations that most people “would not willingly impose on
189
themselves if they were outsiders to their own community.”
Jeb
Rubenfeld would require compensation when property is put to a
190
Daniel Farber proposes a “uniform rule” which would
public use.
require the government to compensate all property owners from

184. See supra note 173 (asserting that Michelman’s utilitarian analysis and his
fairness analysis often have similar results).
185. Michelman, supra note 11, at 1221.
186. Id. at 1221-23.
187. An argument could be made that the taking is not unfair over the long term,
given the possibility that slaves might, eventually become slave owners themselves
and benefit from the taking. Such an outcome seems unlikely. The correlation of
slavery with status as a member of a racial minority suggests that the same harms are
likely to fall on the same groups over the long term.
188. Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-65 (1964).
189. FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 62.
190. See Rubenfeld, supra note 16, at 1078-80.
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whom it seizes land, thereby providing “horizontal equity” by
ensuring that politically vulnerable groups are not denied
191
Saul Levmore suggests that burdens created by
compensation.
government actions, which would be compensable in tort law if they
resulted from a private party’s actions, should be compensable under
192
the Takings Clause. The Takings Clause, he suggests, is intended to
protect individual actors (non-repeat players) from being unfairly
193
taken advantage of by interest group politics.
Despite their different approaches and beliefs regarding the
purpose of the Takings Clause, the aforementioned commentators all
put forth ideas that could potentially support an argument favoring
compensation for the taking of slaves’ self-ownership. In particular,
Fischel’s, Farber’s, and Sax’s theories would seem to strongly favor
compensation for slave takings. Sax’s theory supports the idea of
takings compensation for slavery, because slavery was a taking that
increased the government’s wealth, and was not enacted to arbitrate
disputes; Fischel’s theory supports compensation because slaves lack a
voice in the political process, and most persons would not willingly
impose a condition like slavery upon themselves; and Farber’s
approach supports compensation because of its emphasis on
protecting politically vulnerable groups. Takings compensation for
slavery, then, can be viewed as consistent with these leading scholars’
understandings of the purpose of the Takings Clause.
B. Avoiding the Constitutional Endorsement Problem
Slavery played a dominant, if unstated role, in the ratification of
the Constitution.
Madison and other Framers realized that
confrontation with southern leaders about the future of slavery was
not politically feasible and that such debate could derail the
194
Constitutional Convention.
As such, the Framers sought to avoid
the question of slavery at the Convention, thereby implicitly allowing
195
the South to continue the practice.
Had an abolitionist country
196
been pursued, there would likely have been no federal government.
191. See Daniel Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY
279, 306-08 (1992).
192. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 135053 (1991).
193. See Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 28789 (1990).
194. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 435-37 (arguing that James Madison
maneuvered to prevent early debates on slavery out of a fear that they might
prematurely end the convention).
195. See id. at 424 (arguing that the construction of the Constitution was in part
based on an attempt to protect the interests of slaveowners); see also PAUL FINKELMAN,
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Because the present federal structure only came into being as a
result of a concession to slave states, the Constitution’s entire
197
For this
structure, Paul Finkelman writes, was anti-emancipation.
198
reason, southerners saw the document as no threat to slavery.
However, to avoid antagonizing the North, the approval of a proslavery constitution was accomplished through circumlocution—thus,
the word “slavery” never appeared in the document until the
199
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified.
The Constitution directly discusses slavery in five places: the
200
201
Three-Fifths Clause; the Importation Clause; the Fugitive Slave
202
203
Clause; and two other incidental references. Finkelman contends
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 6-10 (1999)
(noting that Southern delegates “tenaciously fought” for slaveowner’s interests,
managed to inject the issue of slavery into “almost every debate,” and were generally
successful in preserving those interests).
196. See, e.g., Finkelman, supra note 92, at 437-40 (contending that if the states that
favored population-based representation could not have convinced the smaller states
to compromise, the entire Constitutional Convention might have been derailed); id.
at 453-56 (describing the “dirty compromise,” under which southern representatives
to the Constitutional Convention agreed to support the Commerce Clause in
exchange for northern support for the proscription on state export taxes—taxes
which were considered an attack on slavery); cf. id. at 425-47 (noting abolitionist
criticism of the compromise). Wendell Phillips, an abolitionist, argued that the
Nation as a whole went into the compromise knowingly and willingly. WENDELL
PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION, A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT 5 (1856).
197. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 432 (stating that the Constitution created a
federal government with limited powers that “ensured against emancipation”).
198. See id. at 432-33 (arguing that because the federal government created by the
Constitution was not empowered to regulate the states directly, most Southerners did
not feel that it threatened slavery, and as such, did not oppose its ratification).
199. See id. at 427 (noting that the Southern representatives to the constitutional
convention conceded that, in place of the term “slavery,” the phrase “other persons”
would instead be used in the Constitution).
200. The Three-Fifths Clause states, “Representatives and direct Taxes shall be
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 3.
201. The Importation Clause states, “The Migration or Importation of such
Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight,
but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars
for each Person.” Id. § 9, cl. 1.
202. The Fugitive Slave Clause states, “No Person held to Service of Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labor, but shall be
delivered upon Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labor may be due.” Id.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
203. The first incidental reference reads, “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken.” Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. That is, the method defined in the ThreeFifths clause will be used to determine population for the purposes of taxation.
The other incidental reference sets out the rules for amending the Constitution.
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that, “taken together, these five provisions gave the South a strong
204
claim to ‘special treatment’ for its peculiar institution.” In addition,
a number of other constitutional clauses indirectly related to
205
slavery.
This evidence suggests a potential constitutional endorsement
problem: If the Constitution allows or endorses slavery in some
places (such as the various slave clauses), it might be inconsistent to
read it as implicitly disallowing it in another. This obstacle can be
avoided by showing that there is reason either to disregard any
implied endorsement or to limit it so as not affect the viability of a
takings claim.
There are several ways to do this. First, one way to avoid this
problem is by emphasizing that the constitutionality of slavery is not
universally accepted. A number of contemporaneous abolitionist

It states, “The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . Provided that no Amendment
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in
any Manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the Ninth Section of the first
Article . . . .” Id. art. V. That is, the slavery clauses could not be modified by
amendment prior to 1808.
204. See Finkelman, supra note 92, at 429 (noting that this claim is supported by
the “extra political muscle” provided to southern states by the Three-Fifths Clause).
205. Finkelman asserts that slavery was affected and aided by the following clauses:
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (empowering Congress to raise militias to “suppress
Insurrections,” including slave rebellions); id. § 9, cl. 5 (prohibiting the federal
government from taxing exports, thereby preventing indirect taxation on the
exportation of slaves); id. § 10, cl. 2 (prohibiting state taxation of exports and
imports, thereby preventing states in which slavery was not legal from taxing the
products of slave labor); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (establishing the Electoral College, which
ensured that voters in slaveholding states would play a disproportionate role in
electing the President); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (allowing new slave states to be
admitted); id. § 4 (guaranteeing that the U.S. Government would protect states from
“domestic violence,” including slave rebellions); id. art. V (ensuring that the slave
states could prevent any constitutional prohibition of slavery, because of the threefourths majority necessary for the ratification of Constitutional amendments).
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 429-30.
Finkelman also discusses clauses that, while not inherently favoring slavery,
ultimately protected it by way of later judicial interpretation of congressional act:
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, the Naturalization Clause (granting Congress the power
to prohibit the naturalization of non-whites); id. cl. 17, the Federal District Clause
(allowing Congress the power to authorize and regulate slavery in Washington,
D.C.); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, the Diversity Jurisdiction Clause (giving judges the power
to prevent slaves and free Blacks from bringing suit in federal courts, by extending
the right to sue in federal court only to “citizens” of different states, and not to
inhabitants); id. art. IV, § 1, the Full Faith and Credit Clause (requiring each state to
grant legal recognition to the laws and judicial proceedings of other states, thus
obligating free states to recognize laws creating and protecting slavery); id. § 2, cl. 1,
the Privileges and Immunities clause (mandating that citizens of all states be given
equal rights in other states, but failing to extend these rights to Blacks); and id. § 3,
cl. 2 (empowering Congress to regulate the territories so as to protect slavery).
Finkelman, supra note 92, at 430-32.
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206

scholars argued that slavery was unconstitutional. The strength of
their arguments is magnified by the eventual vindication of their
cause. While slavery was not abolished until the passage of the
207
Thirteenth Amendment, it can be considered unconstitutional
prior to that time; the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery without
directly affecting any constitutional text except the slave clauses,
suggesting that any implied endorsement did not have full
constitutional approval.
The slavery clauses expired early in the nation’s history and were
completely mooted by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Further,
nowhere else in the Constitution is there any affirmation of the
validity of slavery. If slavery was already unconstitutional—an
appealing conclusion—then there was no implicit endorsement of
slavery.
Second, any implied endorsement of slavery is almost certainly at
odds with modern law. If the government were to enact new laws
allowing slavery, a strong case could be made that victims would be
208
entitled to takings compensation.
The stark difference between
modern law and any prior slavery endorsement suggest that society
209
does not have a strong reason to honor any prior endorsement.
Third, the Takings Clause’s general language is strong enough to
override any suggestions that the slave clauses act to contradict it.
206. See, e.g., GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
SLAVERY (1841) (arguing that the states violated the Constitution when they
secured slavery); LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1860)
(arguing that absolute rights—the rights which “God and nature” created—are
vested in all humankind, and, accordingly, slavery, which restricts the absolute right
of liberty, has never been constitutional); JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 7 (Mnemosyne 1969) (n.d.) (stating that
if slavery were constitutional, the federal government would have had to guarantee,
and thereby enforce, slavery); Frederick Douglass, The American Constitution and the
Slave: An Address Delivered in Glasgow, Scotland, on 26 March 1860, in 3 THE FREDERICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS, SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES AND INTERVIEWS 340-66 (John W.
Blassingame ed., 1985) (advocating that the Constitution is not a slave-holding
instrument, and as such does not, and never did, guarantee the right for one group
of people to enslave another group). For a modern discussion of these arguments,
see Randy E. Barnett, Essay, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth
Amendment?: Lysander Spooner;s Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977, 988-1014
(1997) (examining Spooner’s theory and arguing that it is superior to alternative
theories).
207. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction”).
208. Of course, other compensation would probably also be available.
209. Discounting of any constitutional implication of slavery because of changed
modern law requires one to apply the modern law retroactively. The history of
takings law—and of common law in general—has been one of retroactive application
of legal standards.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing retroactivity
objections).
OF
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Even if the Framers believed that the Takings Clause, as drafted, did
not require compensation for slavery, the text itself is what was
ratified. As Richard Epstein suggests, “the dominant loyalty is not to
210
the framers’ views [if any] of the consequences it entailed.”
It is
possible that the Framers meant to endorse both the Takings Clause
and any idea contrary to its text without being aware of the implicit
211
tension between the two.
Their explicit decision to endorse the
text of Takings Clause takes precedence over their silent belief that
212
other constitutional provisions inherently limit the clause’s effect.
If in conflict with the text, the “unwritten expectations of the
213
framers . . . must yield to the internal written logic of the text.”
This approach allows any expectation by the Framers that slavery
would not require compensation to yield to the text’s internal written
214
logic that slavery is compensable. Epstein suggests that the Framers
drafted the clause in general terms, with the question of how it
applied to particular situations left for future generations to
215
uncover.
Thus, Epstein posits, the correct attitude towards the
216
Framers view, if any, is “ambivalence toward[s] historical sources.”
This corresponds to the analysis already set forth: There is no direct
evidence that the Framers viewed the Takings Clause as inapplicable
to slavery, and even if they had, that expectation would properly be
217
ignored.
This textualist argument—relying on the text of the

210. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 28. Epstein uses this analysis to argue that wage
controls, which may not have been considered by the Framers to be compensable
within the Takings Clause, are in fact a taking. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. One manner in which slavery differs from Epstein’s analysis, of course, is
that he is dealing with application of takings to a novel situation. The Framers never
dealt with rent control, workers’ compensation, issues surrounding oil and gas
interests, or the details involved with zoning. Id. To the extent that Epstein’s
argument relies on this element of novelty, it is less persuasive in the area of slavery,
which the framers were painfully familiar with. However, Epstein’s analysis and his
general propositions do not seem restricted to areas of novelty. While they may have
even more weight in those areas, they certainly have potent persuasive power even in
areas of law, such as slavery, with which the Framers were familiar.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 29.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Sketchy support for resolving the ambiguity in favor of compensation can be
found in the fact that the Bill of Rights, as amendments, technically were adopted
after the body of the Constitution and thus might benefit from the “later in time”
rule. However, any later-in-time application is dubious since the two documents were
adopted essentially at the same time. There are also representation problems with
this argument. That is, the southern states likely would have balked if they had
realized that they were forcing compensation for slavery. It seems unfair to ascribe to
them support for this idea; such a late shift is suspect on grounds of democratic
accountability.
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clause, rather than any subjective intent of the Framers —leads to
219
the same conclusion as more liberal arguments.
Fourth, even if the Constitution endorses slavery, the limited scope
of that endorsement means that takings claims are not barred. The
slavery clauses do not endorse slavery, nor do they express a
government’s desire to protect slave owners or prevent any
compensation to slaves. The three main slavery clauses have no
bearing at all on takings compensation: Neither the Three-Fifths
Clause, the Importation Clause, nor the Fugitive Slave Clause is
inconsistent with the idea of compensation to slaves for their taken
220
self-ownership.
Fifth, assuming that the Constitution endorses slavery, such
endorsement is consistent with requiring takings compensation for
any harm caused. Indeed, even explicit constitutional approval of a
practice does not preclude a requirement of takings compensation if
221
property is taken pursuant to that authority.
For example,
government may seize property under the War Power, or regulate
trade under the Commerce Power, yet still trigger the Takings Clause
requirement of compensation. Similarly, acts undertaken pursuant
to any constitutional endorsement of slavery may still require
compensation under the Takings Clause.
In summary, constitutional endorsement of slavery, if it exists, does
not prevent a takings claim. Such endorsement was contested at the
time slavery existed, and is certainly out of step with modern law. It
goes against the strong language of the clause itself. Finally, it is
sufficiently limited in scope that it does not affect takings claims.

218. This argument is textualist in that it relies on the text of the clause. However,
if the Framers did not believe that the Takings Clause governed slavery, and if that
belief was widely held among the populace, this argument may not comport with
versions of textualism or originalism that rely on contemporaneous definitions.
219. The Supreme Court has allowed the Takings Clause to be applied to many
types of cases that were not contemplated by the Framers—most prominently to
regulatory takings. See infra notes 285-287.
220. In fact, as noted above, the language of the Fugitive Slave clause suggests that
slavery was a creation of regulation, a man-made blemish upon the underlying
baseline of freedom. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979) (recognizing
that proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority does not create a
“blanket exception to the Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment); United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261 (1950) (noting that the United States
was responsible for compensating the lessee of condemned property taken by the
government pursuant to its War Powers).
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IV. THE PRIMA FACIE TAKINGS CASE
This Part addresses what would be required for a takings case based
on the slavery takings. Section A discusses the elements of a Takings
Clause violation, and section B discusses defenses likely to arise in
response to such an action.
A. Elements of a Takings Clause Violation
The Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for
222
public use, without just compensation.” A Takings Clause violation
claim has four prerequisites. First, private property must exist.
223
Second, this property must be taken by the government. Third, the
224
Fourth, the original owner must
taking must be for public use.
225
have not been compensated for the taking. This Article has already
226
examined the first two elements: private property and taking by the
227
This section examines the remaining two elements
government.
that would need to be established to show a prima facie case: public
use and lack of compensation.
1.

Public use
The public use requirement is unlikely to be an obstacle for three
reasons. First, under the case law, public use has not been strictly
228
Second, in instances where
required in regulatory takings cases.
public use is required, courts have been extremely lenient and
229
allowed compensation based on the thinnest reeds of public use.

222. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
223. In many cases, these first two elements are combined, since the existence of
private property can often be assumed. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992). In this Article they have been examined separately, since there is a
potential question about the existence of private property.
224. Brown v. Legal Found. of Washington, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1417 (2003).
225. Id.
226. See supra Part I (discussing property right of self-ownership).
227. See supra Part II (discussing slavery as a taking).
228. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 323-24 (2002) (acknowledging the distinction between acquisitions of property
for public use and regulations prohibiting private uses of property, thereby making it
inappropriate for courts to treat physical takings cases as controlling precedents for
regulatory takings cases).
229. One important case in this area is Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 462-63 (Mich. 1981), which held that a large private
company taking property of homeowners in order to expand its factory constituted a
public use. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984), the
Supreme Court determined that private land taken from landowners and
redistributed to homeowners and lessees under a legislative scheme intended to
break up large parcels historically controlled by a land oligopoly constituted a public
use. Breaking up the private land was found to have the public use of “[r]egulating
oligopoly and the evils associated with it.” Id. at 241-43. The case law has led one
scholar to characterize the public use requirement as “extremely permissive.”
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The Supreme Court has written that, “where the exercise of the
eminent domain powers is rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be
230
proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”
Third, even if a concrete public use were needed, it is clear that
slavery had important public uses. Slavery allowed for agricultural
advances, particularly the cultivation of tobacco, which sustained
231
large segments of the colonial economies.
Slavery allowed
plantation owners to receive acceptable returns on invested capital,
232
encouraging them to invest in their plantations.
Numerous
economic studies have demonstrated that the Southern economy was
driven by slave labor, with which it was able to maintain profitability
233
and growth. One estimate is that slaves contributed $40 million to
234
the U.S. economy between 1790 and 1860 alone.
Governments also directly reaped benefits from the legality of
slavery. One major area in which governments benefited was in
revenue from slave taxes. One scholar notes that, beginning with
colonial times and continuing throughout the Civil War, slave taxes
raised more revenue for the American governments than any other
235
source.
Property taxes on slaves comprised a majority or a nearmajority of property tax revenue in North Carolina, South Carolina,
236
Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, and other southern states. Prior to the
ratification of the Constitution, slave imports were also a significant
FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 72.
230. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
231. BELL, supra note 3, at 49 (noting that slave labor significantly impacted the
colonies’ growth and development in the eighteenth century); G. Melvin Herndon,
Tobacco, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 735 (noting that
once tobacco began to be produced in large quantities, plantations shifted to
primarily slave labor); JAMES WALVIN, BLACK IVORY: A HISTORY OF BRITISH SLAVERY 8-10
(1992) (discussing how Maryland and Virginia profited greatly from tobacco because
of slave labor); see also Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40 (noting the economic
benefits of slavery, including tobacco cultivation).
232. Harold D. Woodman, Profitability of Slavery, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN
SLAVERY, supra note 71, at 592, 595-96 (acknowledging that slavery was economically
profitable, but also suggesting that slavery profited whites socially by allowing them to
stay in control).
233. Id.; Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40 (providing specific economic statistics
as to how each state profited as a result of slavery).
234. Complaint and Jury Trial Demand ¶ 10, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston
Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). The current value of that
amount, though difficult to pin down, is probably in the trillions of dollars. See
Matthew Kaufman, The Cost of Slavery was High, But Who Will Pay It?, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 29, 2002, at 75-76 (noting estimates ranging from $2 trillion to $12
trillion); see also Robert Browne, The Economic Case for Reparations to Black America, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 39, 39-46 (1972) (calculating various possible methods for valuing
slave labor).
235. Outterson, supra note 91, at 135.
236. Id. at 138-40.
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source of tax revenue. Governments depended largely on property
taxes and taxes on imports—income taxes would not become
constitutionally acceptable until the passage of the Sixteenth
238
Amendment in 1913.
Even if taxes are not considered evidence of public use,
governments benefited in many other ways from slavery. Local
governments auctioned off unclaimed vagrant slaves, contraband
239
slaves, and sometimes slaves of intestates. These sales were no small
matter; for example, one scholar estimates that half of South
Carolina’s annual slave sales were court-conducted sales caused by
probate auctions, mortgage foreclosures, and sheriffs’ seizures of
240
debtors’ property.
Other local governments reaped similar
241
benefits.
The federal government also profited from slavery.
The
Continental Congress levied funds from the states, much of which
242
had been derived in the first instance from slave taxes. The federal
government also imposed slave property taxes twice, and incredibly,
auctioned off the slaves who were aboard ships seized for slave
243
trading after the transatlantic trade was outlawed in 1808.
In addition to direct benefits, governments received indirect
244
benefits. One such benefit was the availability of cheap labor.
245
Another was taxation on slave products, such as tobacco and cotton.
In sum, the direct and indirect benefits governments received from
slavery are sufficient to satisfy the public use requirement.

237. Id. at 138-40, 144-45. Through direct and indirect taxes, slavery “supported
the bulk of the revenue needs of Southern governments.” Id. at 147.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the “power to lay and collect
taxes in incomes”).
239. See Russell, supra note 80, at 484-90 (highlighting individual stories of slaves
travelling on a seized ship who were delivered to New Orleans’ local sheriff’s
department and sold).
240. See Russell, supra note 80, at 485-87 (“South Carolina’s courts operated as a
great auctioneering firm. The various agents of the courts drew profits from the sale
of slaves in the form of commissions, just as commission-merchants did.”).
241. Outterson, supra note 91, at 138-40, 144 (discussing that Maryland and
Virginia profited off of tobacco because of slave labor, and Florida, Louisiana, and
Mississippi benefited from high slave taxes).
242. Id. at 144.
243. Id. at 145-46.
244. See, e.g., ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 2-6 (chronicling government use of cheap
slave labor to build the Capitol building).
245. See Outterson, supra note 91, at 147-48 (noting that in addition to providing
exports which could be taxed, slave labor also created wealth for slave owners, who
could then purchase imports which were also taxed).
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2.

Lack of compensation
The final element for showing a compensable taking is to establish
that slaves were not compensated. It is axiomatic that slaves were not
paid for their services. However, it could conceivably be argued that
they were otherwise remunerated, either through emancipation or
246
through transport to the New World.
After the original taking of their self-possession, slaves had one
major group interaction with government: their emancipation.
Though emancipation was a beneficial government act from the
point of view of those freed, it does not constitute compensation
because emancipation itself provided no monetary relief.
One popular idea accompanying emancipation was to give freed
slaves forty acres of land and certain surplus and seized army animals
247
(often characterized as “forty acres and a mule”).
President
Johnson, bowing to political pressure, killed the legislation, and the
248
It is possible that, had such
freed slaves instead received nothing.
246. Some conservative opponents of reparations have argued that certain
governmental programs which benefit Blacks suffice as compensation. See, e.g., John
McWhorter, Against Reparations, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 23, 2001, at 32, 36-37
(asserting that the large and unprecedented expansion of welfare over the past forty
years should be considered as constituting reparations). Cf. Outterson, supra note
91, at 136 (noting the argument sometimes made that events in American history,
such as the Civil War and emancipation, coupled with the New Deal and affirmative
action, effectively constitute reparations).
As a general matter, this argument seems dubious. Welfare payments are income
based and are made irrespective of one’s race or ancestry. Plus, numerous slave
descendants are ineligible for welfare. Cf. Kenneth Brooks, Social Contradictions,
VALLEJO TIMES-HERALD, Aug. 26, 2002 (“Being poor is not and should not be a
requirement for receiving compensation for inhumane treatment.”), available at
http://timesheraldonline.com/articles/2002/08/28/export2814.txt (on file with
the American University Law Review).
The characterization of welfare as takings compensation would be especially
inappropriate. No court or commentator has suggested that takings victims are
limited in their ability to bring takings claims by the presence or absence of receipt
of other government monies. To adapt the fact pattern of a well-known takings case,
even if a developer received tax breaks, development grants, or other government
aid, he may still properly bring a takings claim if a state takes his property by
regulation. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). One’s ability to
bring a takings claim is independent of other government payments. In fact, if
welfare is a reparation, then Blacks are being “taken” once again, since whites are the
numerical majority of welfare recipients. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF AFDC RECIPIENTS, FISCAL
YEAR 1992 47 (1992) (noting that whites constituted thirty-nine percent of welfare
recipients in 1992, while Blacks were only thirty-seven percent of recipients).
247. The forty acres idea originated with General Sherman’s Special Field Order
No. 15, in which he ordered that certain seized confederate land be distributed to
freed slaves, who would receive forty acres each. See Special Field Order No. 15, in
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 3, at 365-66. Following Sherman’s order,
Radical Republicans proposed legislation granting forty acres to each freed slave. See
Lopez, supra note 5, at 653-55.
248. Id. at 654; see Chisolm, supra note 5, at 685-87 (noting that the Freedman’s
Bureau Act of 1865, if passed, would have allowed for up to three million acres of
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awards been given, they could have served as full or partial
compensation for the government taking.
However, the
compensation requirement is not satisfied by an unmet promise.
Slaves did have their taken property, their self-ownership, restored
249
to them through emancipation.
However, restoration of taken
property is not sufficient compensation in takings claims.
Government must pay compensation for the time it possessed the
250
property—rent, so to speak.
Case law is clear the question of
whether a taking is worthy of compensation hinges not at all upon
whether the act was permanent or temporary; the just compensation
251
clause does not differentiate between the two.
An argument could be made that transportation to the New World
was itself compensation. On the surface, this argument has some
appeal. Transatlantic fares cost hundreds or thousands of dollars in
today’s money. Other cases have allowed “in kind compensation” to
252
meet constitutional requirements.
However, any characterization
land to freed slaves).
249. “Emancipation” as used here refers to all government actions to end slavery,
which took place at different times in different states. Most Northern states ended
slavery years before the Civil War. For example, slavery in Massachusetts was
gradually ended after the adoption of the Massachusetts Constitution in 1780 and
the subsequent judicial interpretation of that constitution as prohibiting slavery.
HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 18, at 89-99. Pennsylvania passed legislation in 1780,
which provided for the “Gradual Abolition” of slaves. Id. at 299. Under that law, all
children born to slaves after passage of the law would serve their masters until the
age of twenty-eight, after which they would be free. Id. at 299-304. Pennsylvania also
passed a law in 1788 restricting interstate travel of slaves to prevent slave traders from
taking pregnant slaves out of the state to avoid emancipation. Id. at 304-05.
New York, needing soldiers to help fight the Revolutionary War and alarmed that
slaves might join the British, passed legislation in 1781 authorizing manumission of
slaves who fought in the war. Id. at 137-38. In 1785, New York attempted to ban the
slave trade, although the law had easily exploitable loopholes. In 1788, New York
banned the export of slaves to other states to close those loopholes, and in 1799,
finally passed a law to gradually emancipate the slaves. Children born to slave
mothers were to become free at the age of twenty-eight for men and twenty-five for
women. Finally, in 1817, New York passed a law which ended slavery by 1855. Id. at
138-47. Slaves in Southern states were freed by action of the emancipation
proclamation. Slaves in border states were not affected by the emancipation
proclamation and were freed by operation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
250. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (suggesting payment
for the use of owner’s land is analogous to interest).
251. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987) (explaining that denying a landowner the use of his property is a
taking whether it is temporary or permanent). But cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306, 319-20 (2002) (finding no
per se physical taking where regulation prevented development for a period of thirtytwo months).
252. As early as Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, in 1922, the Court recognized that
some government acts provide “an average reciprocity of advantage that has been
recognized as a justification of various laws.” 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For example,
government seizure of some zoning or development rights, accompanied by the
provision of other rights, can provide adequate compensation so as to defuse a
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of transportation as in-kind compensation is entirely inappropriate.
253
Unlike voluntary immigration, transportation was forced on slaves.
It subjected slaves to horrendous conditions that commonly killed a
254
third or more of a ship’s “cargo.” It therefore cannot satisfy the just
255
compensation requirement.
B. Defenses
There are three primary defenses that might be asserted against a
256
takings claim:
statute of limitations, sovereign immunity, and
257
retroactivity. Each is examined in this Section.

takings claim. See, e.g., Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137-38
(1978) (failing to find a compensable taking in city landmark law due in part to city’s
provision to landowner of other development rights).
253. Not only did slaves not choose to come to America, there has been a strong
“Back to Africa” element in much of Black political discourse, exemplified by the
work of Marcus Garvey. See generally Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic
Development as Progressive Politics, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 412 n.48 (2001) (citing
literature that discusses the impact of Marcus Garvey’s advocation in the 1920s that
Blacks migrate back to Africa). See also AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING
FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 195-97, 210
(2003) (criticizing the paternalistic idea that most people in other countries would
prefer to be in America).
254. One case brought by insurers to recover the value of lost “property”
illustrates the generally brutal treatment of slaves in transit. The court noted:
[S]ixty negroes died for want of water for sustenance; and forty others, for
want of water for sustenance, and through thirst and frenzy thereby
occasioned, threw themselves into the sea and were drowned; and the master
and mariners, for the preservation of their own lives, and the lives of the rest
of the negroes, which for want of water they could not otherwise preserve,
were obliged to throw overboard 150 other negroes.
Gregson v. Gilbert, 99 Eng. Rep. 629, 629 (K.B. 1783).
255. Even if transportation could be considered compensation for the slaves who
survived, the numerous slaves who died in transit were not compensated.
256. Other special defenses exist in Takings Clause jurisprudence, but none of
these are applicable in the slavery context. For example, the government is generally
not required to pay compensation where a taking is intended to remedy a nuisance,
rather than to increase societal wealth. Such takings—for example, shutting down a
plant emitting noxious fumes—are properly viewed as exercises of the police power,
rather than the takings power. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 110-21; FISCHEL, supra note
11, at 59-61. This exception is not applicable to the taking of slaves’ self-ownership.
The Takings Clause is subject to a host of other sundry defenses under certain
situations that are inapplicable in the context of slavery. See, e.g., Benjamin
Longstreth, Note, Protecting “The Wastes of the Foreshore”: The Federal Navigational
Servitude and its Origins in State Public Trust Doctrine, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 471, 471
(2002) (noting that under the navigational servitude doctrine, the federal
government is not required to pay compensation to private interests if they are
regulating navigable waters to protect navigation).
257. Each of these defenses would be raised by the government. Private actors are
not likely to have standing to challenge a takings suit. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 153, at 714 (discussing the lack of standing to challenge descendancy-based
reparations scheme). But cf. id. at 716-18 (noting possibility that plaintiffs might have
standing to challenge racially-based schemes).
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1.

Statute of limitations
In federal cases, the normal statute of limitations for bringing a
258
claim is six years. Unless the statutory defense can be avoided, any
takings claim based on slavery would be barred because of the time
259
elapsed since the taking. However, there are several exceptions to
the statute of limitations that could apply.
An initial route is to argue that the statute should be tolled because
260
of an inability in bringing claims at an earlier date. Claims against
261
states could not be brought under federal law until incorporation.
In addition, claims were de facto barred for many years by rules, both
262
explicit and implicit, denying Blacks access to the courts. Thus, any
inability on the part of slave descendants to bring an action earlier
stems not from their own inaction or “sleeping on their rights,” but
263
rather from societal flaws over which they had no control. In such
circumstances, it makes sense to prohibit the state from raising delaybased defenses when the state’s actions contributed to the inability to
seek a remedy earlier. This is similar to the “discovery rule” where a
264
statute of limitations is tolled until the harm is discovered.
Here,
258. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2002).
259. The only Takings Clause claim brought by Japanese Americans for lost
property due to internment during World War II was dismissed after a long
procedural battle, on grounds of government immunity and statute of limitations.
Hohri v. United States, 586 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1984). See generally Magee, supra
note 5 (detailing the history of Hohri dismissal and the difficulties in obtaining
successful reparations claims).
260. See generally 4 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1056, at 255-63 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing how the principle of equitable tolling can
halt the running of a statute of limitations if the plaintiff uses reasonable care to
learn the facts that would discover the defendant’s wrongful acts). But cf. Hair v.
United States, No. 02-5115, 2003 WL 22805336, at *6-*8 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 2003)
(finding that the government need not provide “notice” of its refusal to pay claims in
order to begin the statute of limitations period).
261. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 76 (alleging that, until the federal
government properly enforced the Fourteenth Amendment, the immunity enjoyed
by states would continue); Does America Owe a Debt to Descendants of its Slaves, supra
note 4, at 83 (“[N]o former slave could have sued in, say, 1870 and expected to get a
hearing”).
262. See Christopher Waldrop, Black Access to Law in Reconstruction: The Case of
Warren County, Mississippi, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 583-84 (1994) (arguing that
freed slaves did not feel fully free to use the legal system and that the failure of
reformers to “fully open the legal system to freed slaves” doomed reconstruction and
increased white supremacy).
263. Because slaves had no control over these societal flaws, the situation is
analogous to the doctrine of futility in administrative law contexts. See generally
Robert C. Power, Help Is Sometimes Close at Hand: The Exhaustion Problem and the
Ripeness Solution, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 547, 578-79 (1987) (describing the futility
exception to administrative exhaustion requirements, which holds that where further
administrative proceedings would be futile, delaying judicial review until their
completion is unnecessary).
264. See, e.g., Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671, 671-72 (Fla.
1981) (tolling statute of limitations in suit against a chemical manufacturer where
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the legally cognizable harm was not practically able to be addressed
in court until recently.
Similarly, a case can be made that the taking behavior is
265
continuing, in which case no statute of limitations applies. As selfownership is an inalienable right, any taking can be considered
continuous. Each day, the government designated slaves as property
and illegitimately confiscated their inalienable property right of selfownership. As this seizure was illegitimate, it could not affect the
underlying inalienability of the property, and therefore a similar
taking necessarily occurred the next day, and the next, and so on.
Every time the government reasserted slaves’ status as the property of
others, slaves’ inalienable self-ownership property rights were
retaken. Because the transfer of property interests was never
legitimate, even slaves who were born into the slavery system—never
having experienced uncontested control of their self-ownership—
266
were takings victims.
It is also possible to argue that the original taking and the
derivative harm are part of the same takings transaction. That is, not
only was slavery a taking, but it was part of a continuous taking, still in
effect today, from Blacks. Under that view, the entire treatment of
Blacks, from slavery up to modern discrimination, constitutes part of
the same taking.
Statutes of limitation are also subject to specific exceptions for war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
The United Nations
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity is clear in that it forbids
statutory limitations in two situations: war crimes and crimes against

the harm was not discovered until twenty years after actual tort).
265. See Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(tolling statute of limitations because of defendant bank’s “continued denial and
failure to return the looted assets to plaintiffs”); Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting
the Selection and Positioning of Human Rights Class Actions in the United States Courts, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 623, 627-29 (2002) (stating that the victims of human rights
abuses are often prevented by their abuse from pursuing litigation until after the
statute of limitations has run and suggesting that equitable tolling principles may
provide a solution).
Similarly, the slavery taking behavior is continuous because the state has made no
attempt to reimburse slaves for the taking of their self-ownership property rights, yet
continues to profit from this taking. Cf. Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations
Litigation Through the Eyes of the Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 457, 470-71
(2002) (discussing the unfairness of using a statute of limitations in adjudication with
respect to the idea of continuing harm). But see Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,
1108 (9th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a continuous harm argument when dismissing a tortbased reparations claims on statute of limitations grounds).
266. See infra notes 323-324 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for a
takings claim, regardless of when the claimant obtained title).
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267

humanity.
This Convention applies directly to criminal
268
prosecutions and does not speak to other legal actions. However, it
seems consistent to suggest that a taking or other legal action, if
committed incident to a war crime or crime against humanity, would
be within the aegis of the Convention, and hence not subject to
269
statutes of limitations.
Though the convention was not adopted
270
until 1968, it was designed to operate retroactively.
The taking of slaves’ property rights of self-ownership might fit
under either of these two exceptions. Slavery was a war crime,
271
because slaves were generally taken through wars.
In fact, the
267. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 40,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968) [hereinafter Convention]. See also Does America Owe a Debt to
the Descendants of Its Slaves?, supra note 4, at 83 (discussing the necessity of the war
crimes and the crimes against humanity exceptions in light of the absolutely serious
nature of the crimes).
268. Convention, supra note 267, at 40.
269. Cf. Does America Owe a Debt to the Descendants of its Slaves?, supra note 4, at 83
(suggesting that standard reparations claims could rely on these two exceptions).
270. See Duc V. Trang, Beyond the Historical Justice Debate: The Incorporation of
International Law and the Impact on Constitutional Structures and Rights in Hungary, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 3-6 (1995) (discussing a Hungarian case wherein a draft law
that allowed for the prosecution of crimes committed during an uprising in the
1950s, which contained explicit reference to the Convention, was upheld despite its
retroactive application); Jean-Olivier Viout, The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against
Humanity, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 155, 159-61 (1999) (discussing a French case
against a former Nazi in which the Convention rules were applies retroactively); cf.
Matthew Lippman, Crimes Against Humanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 171, 190-92,
232-38 (1997) (discussing how statutory limitations threaten application of justice
against Nazi war criminals).
The retroactive application of the treaty is subject to some limitations. It is always
problematic to apply modern standards to acts completed when the world looked at
rights differently. It is possible that slavery gradually became a crime against
humanity and therefore escaped notice by the legislatures and executive. However,
abolitionist arguments may have put the United States on notice of this change.
Discussions of the evils of slavery, such as Chief Justice Marshall’s Antelope opinion,
may provide evidence that the United States was on notice that slavery constituted a
crime against humanity. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825).
There was also widespread belief that slavery was wrong even as it was condoned.
The abolition of the slave trade and the universal abolition of slavery late in the
nineteenth century—less than a generation after its abolition in the United States—
suggest knowledge that slavery was a crime against humanity. Thus, application of
the U.N. treaty to circumvent the statute of limitations does not open up the “can of
worms” which allows the Romans to sue the Vandals for the sack of Rome. This
objection has been discussed at some length in the traditional tort-based reparations
literature. See Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra
note 4, at 165, 170 (suggesting that granting reparations raises concerns about giving
restitution to other wronged groups throughout history); Matsuda, supra note 19, at
384-85 (discussing the slippery slope and “outer limit” objections to reparations);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, AN APPROACH TO REPARATIONS 1 (2001) (noting “practical
limits” to time frame for reparations and suggesting that, due to the time problem,
focusing on “contemporary effects” of human rights abuses is most appropriate).
271. See BOAHEN ET AL., supra note 71, at 108-10 (discussing capture of slaves by
war).
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definition of “war crimes” used by the Nuremberg tribunal included
272
slavery. Equally convincing is an argument that the taking involved
in slavery occurred incident to a crime against humanity, and thus no
statute of limitations bar can be raised. Slavery is not difficult to
characterize as a crime against humanity. It is held in universal
opprobrium. Any attempt to institute a regime of slavery today would
273
qualify as a crime against humanity. “If there ever was a crime upon
humanity, what white folks did to black people is the worst,” suggests
274
one commentator.
Statutes of limitations also do not apply where a defendant has
275
engaged in fraudulent concealment.
Fraudulent concealment in
general requires that a plaintiff “prove that the defendant concealed
the wrong and that as a result the plaintiff could not, with due
276
diligence, have discovered his claim.”
Accordingly, an argument
can be made that government acts to limit the ability of Blacks to
bring claims in court were the equivalent of fraudulent concealment
of the taking. Government policies limiting access to court by Blacks

272. Article 6 of the London Agreement defines war crimes as:
[V]iolations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement For the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
6, 59 Stat. 1544.
273. But see Chris McGreal, Britain Blocks EU Apology for Slave Trade, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 3, 2001, at 2 (noting that at the 2001 United Nations Conference on Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, delegates from many
African nations unsuccessfully urged the European Union to characterize the slave
trade as a crime against humanity).
274. SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 83; see also Roger Wareham, The
Popularization of the International Demand for Reparations for African People, in SHOULD
AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 226, 230-36 (describing slavery as a crime against
humanity). Chief Justice Marshall’s Antelope opinion, discussed earlier, could
support a conclusion that the United States knew slavery was a crime against
humanity. See discussion supra note 34. But see Aiyetoro, supra note 265, at 469-71
(noting difficulties in making the case for slavery as a crime against humanity).
275. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (making an
exception for the statute of limitations in all federal cases where the plaintiff has
been defrauded but is unaware of the violation, and preventing the statute of
limitations from starting until after the fraud is discovered); King & King Enters. v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 446 F. Supp. 906, 910 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (citing Holmberg
and other Supreme Court and circuit court precedent when stating the threshold
proposition that, “[i]t is settled that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action
tolls a statute of limitations and that this federal fraudulent concealment rule is read
into every federal statute of limitations”).
276. Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L. J. 829, 855 (1983).
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effectively concealed any remedy available to them, and this
concealment provides support for tolling the statute of limitations.
Finally, the statute of limitations can be avoided through a
277
legislative act: Congress could modify the statute.
2.

Sovereign immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that in many
278
instances, a government may not be sued without its permission.
Sovereign immunity has arisen in other reparations cases. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld dismissal of the
Cato litigation, which sought reparations for slavery, on grounds that
279
the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.
However, recent decisions have established that the defense of
sovereign immunity is not applicable to takings claims. In First English
280
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme
Court noted that the remedy provided under the Takings Clause is
281
“self-executing.” The requirement of compensation is based in the
Constitution, the Court ruled, and fundamental to its notion of
282
This case makes clear that sovereign immunity is not a
justice.
defense to takings claims.
277. See Ratner, supra note 265, at 628-29 (discussing legislative extension of
statutes of limitation); see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313-15
(1945) (upholding Congress’s ability to retrospectively alter statutes of limitation);
SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 4, at 82 (suggesting that one way of avoiding the
statute of limitations in a potential breach-of-contract case for slave reparations
would be for Congress to intervene and waive the statute of limitations).
Other specially tailored exceptions have been created by Congress or the courts
before, such as with Indian land cases. Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d
1070, 1084 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating that “a suit by the United States as trustee on
behalf of an Indian Tribe is not subject to state delay-based defenses” and that it
would be “anomalous to allow the trustee to sue under more favorable conditions
than those afforded the tribes themselves”).
278. See generally Van Dyke, supra note 20, at 76.
279. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
United States can only be sued to the extent that it has waived its sovereign
immunity, and holding that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden to establish that
the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity covered the
plaintiff’s reparations claim).
280. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
281. Id. at 315; see also id. at 316 n.9.
282. See id. at 316 n.9 (stating that the Constitution requires a compensation
remedy whenever there is a taking); id. at 316-17 and cases cited therein (supporting
contention that constitutional law commands compensation in takings cases).
This result has generated similar discussion in subsequent cases as well as in
academia. See Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1994) (stating that when taxes
are “erroneously or illegally assessed,” the taxes should be refunded); Jack M.
Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 338-40 (1988) (suggesting that First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987), prevents
sovereign immunity from barring compensation claims). But see Richard H. Seamon,
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It is not impossible to conceive of a takings jurisprudence that
accords more respect to sovereign immunity, and it is certainly
possible that sovereign immunity may surface at some point and
create problems for any takings claims based on slavery. However, if
current case law is followed, sovereign immunity should not prevent
the bringing of claims for compensation for the taking of slaves’ selfownership property rights.
3.

Impermissible retroactivity
It could be argued that retroactive application of constitutional
standards to a pre-constitutional time period is improper because
slave statutes in the original colonies predated the Constitution.
However, courts generally reject such defenses and rulings of a
283
constitutional nature are commonly applied retroactively.
As the
Supreme Court has emphasized, “Both the common law and
[Supreme Court] decisions have recognized a general rule of
retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court.
Nothing in the Constitution alters the fundamental rule of
retrospective operation that has governed judicial decisions for
284
almost a thousand years.” Takings decisions change the state of the
law, and citizens and governments are expected to conform
285
accordingly.
Takings Clause jurisprudence currently includes many concepts
286
not envisioned by the Framers, such as regulatory takings. Judicial
The Asymmetry of State Sovereign Immunity, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1072-80 (2001)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has not conclusively decided whether sovereign
immunity prevents unconsenting states from being sued for Takings Clause
violations).
283. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94 (1993) (noting that
Supreme Court rulings, when interpreting federal law, must be applied retroactively
to all cases still open on direct review); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501
U.S. 529, 544 (1991) (“When the Court has applied a rule of law to the litigants in
one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural
requirements or res judicata.”).
284. Harper, 509 U.S. at 94.
285. In most civil cases, including takings cases, the correct standard for a court to
apply is whether an action would be a compensable taking under a modern
understanding of the clause, rather than whether it was understood to be
compensable at the time of the taking. Numerous takings cases, such as Mahon and
Penn Central, altered the status of the law in significant ways. For example, Mahon
first established the principle of regulatory takings. See supra notes 114-115. Penn
Central approved of groundbreaking laws, countenancing a rather invasive
confiscation on the grounds that in-kind compensation was acceptable, harm was not
inappropriately targeted, and reciprocity of advantage applied. Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that there was no taking where
the government precluded a property owner from building on his property because
it was designated as a historical landmark).
286. See Treanor, supra note 11, at 849-55 (stating that while compensation for
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acceptance of the regulatory takings doctrine illustrates that the
Takings Clause has not been interpreted to be circumscribed by the
relatively narrow boundaries understood by the Framers. Slavery
does present a particularly special case, a taking that occurred
centuries before any possible remedy, but it can still be addressed
287
using modern understandings of takings.
The fact that a statute predated the Constitution is not sufficient to
immunize it from constitutional requirements. Presumably, a state
assumed the responsibility of bringing its laws into accord with the
288
new Constitution upon ratification.
Thus, state statutes allowing
slavery would trigger takings compensation since states had ratified
the new Constitution.
While states were not bound by the Bill of Rights until its
289
incorporation, which happened well after the abolition of slavery,
the federal government has always been bound by the Bill of Rights.
As a result, federal acquiescence in the taking of slaves may be a
compensable taking. Holding the states accountable for violation of
the federal Takings Clause is not such a stretch either. First, many
290
states have takings clauses of their own.
Second, the failure to
compensate for the prior taking continues to this day—well past
incorporation of the Takings Clause. These arguments provide at
least a colorable claim for holding the states accountable for Takings
Clause violations even prior to incorporation.
In addition, Keith Hylton argues that modern legal standards can
be applied to slavery because slavery is properly viewed not as a law291
sanctioned regime but “as a corruption or displacement of the law.”
Consequently, applying today’s law to slavery should not be seen as
the retroactive application of law to slavery, but rather as “bringing

regulatory takings was not implicitly disagreed with by the Constitution, it was
explicitly rejected by the Framers in discussion).
287. Applying a modern understanding of takings, of course, would allow
compensation for claims brought under a theory of regulatory takings based on the
initial slave laws. If a claim is to be brought under a derivative takings theory, as
suggested above, this problem is less serious; any derivative takings claim would be
based on the effects of slavery on modern-day slave descendants, and, therefore,
would presumably apply modern understandings of the Takings Clause.
288. States that did not ratify the Constitution assumed this responsibility once the
Constitution became operative through its ratification.
289. See FISCHEL, supra note 11, at 65-66 (noting that the Takings Clause was
incorporated to apply to state governments in 1897 with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), in which the Supreme Court held that a
railroad right of way constituted a taking).
290. See id. at 65 (noting that the constitutions of every state except New
Hampshire and North Carolina contain versions of a takings clause).
291. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 11.
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law to a regime from which [law] had been entirely displaced.”
Hylton argues that slaveowners’ insistence on the non-applicability of
293
laws to slaves was itself part of their offense. Such application, while
retroactive, would be limited to cases involving “institution[s] . . .
294
founded on the absence of law.”
In summary, retroactive application of Takings Clause
compensation requirements suffers from the problems common to
retroactive application of any law. However, these considerations are
no more convincing here than in other instances where retroactive
application of law is deemed acceptable and should not be
considered a barrier to takings compensation.
V. TAKINGS CLAIMS IN THE REPARATIONS FRAMEWORK: PRACTICAL
APPLICATIONS
A. Taking Takings to the Courts
This Article has argued that slavery contains the elements of a
Takings Clause violation. In any lawsuit for just compensation based
on slavery, it would be necessary to establish as a legal matter that selfownership is a compensable property right, and that slavery was a
taking of that right.
Advocates could start by bringing lawsuits against the state
governments of states that enacted laws allowing slavery. These suits
would likely be brought in conjunction with other claims, such as
equal protection claims and tort-based reparations claims. Takings
claims could also be added as amendments to complaints in existing
reparations litigation against the government.
Suits against states could bring attorneys general to the bargaining
table for settlement discussions. Should they proceed to jury verdicts,
they could also result in compensation for the taking. However, the
possibility of varied or contradictory judgments would complicate
suits against states.
Suit could also be brought against the federal government. A
federal suit could avoid some problems that might arise in state suits,
such as issues arising from the non-incorporation of the Takings
292. Id. at 3.
293. Id. at 3, 6-7. Hylton argues that what made slavery a special institution is not
the government regulations that supported slavery, but rather the lack of regulations.
Id. at 6. This argument implies an abdication of the government’s Hobbesian role in
controlling bad actors. See id.; see also MODERN PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47, at 51-55
(discussing Hobbesian conception of the role of government).
294. HYLTON, supra note 137, at 10. “The limiting principle is suggested by the
special legal status that the institution claimed for itself.” Id.
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Clause at the time of the takings. It would also introduce new issues;
the federal government, while it participated in slavery, never
participated to the extent that state governments did. As such, the
action of the taking might be harder to establish at the federal level.
As with the states, any suit brought against the federal government
should probably be pursued in conjunction with other related claims,
such as Fourteenth Amendment claims and traditional tort-based
295
reparation claims.
B. Taking Takings to the Legislature
Takings arguments can also be raised in the legislative arena,
where reparations efforts have thus far been unsuccessful.
Reparations advocates could emphasize to Congress and the country
that slaves were kidnapped and their property rights of self-ownership
taken in violation of the Takings Clause. They could highlight the
hypocrisy of Madison and others in suggesting that slave owners—
poor, helpless, victimized slave owners—should receive compensation
for the “taking” of emancipation. Advocates could use the takings
argument to buttress other arguments in favor of reparations,
affirmative action, and government investment in improving Black
296
lives.
The moral weight of the takings argument, combined with the
many other arguments already enlisted by reparations supporters,
could influence Congress to more closely examine the question of
297
reparations, both in the traditional and in the takings context.
295. To bring a suit, plaintiffs would need a representative who has standing. This
could be accomplished by locating a slave descendant to act as a lead plaintiff. See
Aiyetoro, supra note 265, at 467-69 (proposing that standing could be established by
claiming that the U.S. government failed to eliminate, under the Thirteenth
Amendment, the badges and indicia of slavery).
296. Cf. Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 575-80 (2002) (proposing that affirmative
action programs can be seen as a form of reparations); Brief of Amici Curiae The
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) and The
National Conference of Black Lawyers (NCBL) in Support of Respondents at 12-17,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 & 02-516) (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit affirmative action in education to serve as
a reparation for slavery).
297. Some scholars have suggested that resolution of mass claims through the
political process avoids inefficiencies inherent in the judicial system. See, e.g.,
Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the DualTrack System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2170 (2000) (stating that transaction costs for product
liability and environmental claims consume as much as two-thirds of any award given
through the court system). But see Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private
Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947,
971-74 (2001) (suggesting that judicial resolution of compensation claims enjoys the
benefits of flexibility, accountability, visibility, and appropriately vigorous pursuit of
claims).
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Legislators could use the takings argument to point out that America
has a moral obligation to pay for the taking of slaves’ self-ownership,
independent of any legal obligation the country has to make slaves
298
whole.
Legislative framing of the issue as a takings problem may
make any compensation statute less susceptible to attack in court,
given courts’ oftentimes greater protection of property rights than
299
liberty rights.
Even if legislators were unable to enact just
compensation laws, they could possibly assist a takings suit to proceed
more smoothly by legislation as limited as extending the statute of
limitations for slavery takings claims.
C. The Value of Just Compensation
Numerous scholars and advocates have made reparations proposals
and a full treatment of the numerous possibilities for compensation is
beyond the scope of this Article. A brief examination of some
reparations proposals suggests that they could easily be used to satisfy
the just compensation required by the Takings Clause. For example,
numerous reparations scholars, such as Randall Robinson, have
urged the creation of a fund that would provide educational and
300
economic benefits to Blacks.
Some have suggested “subclassing”
award recipients, as in class action lawsuits, to determine appropriate
301
awards. Other advocates, such as Congressman John Conyers, have

298. For a discussion of the use of rhetoric by legislators to create public
awareness of issues and to frame their solutions, see generally Daniel M. Filler,
Random Violence and the Transformation of the Juvenile Justice Debate, 86 VA. L. REV. 1095,
1096, 1110-21 (2000) (reviewing JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE TALK ABOUT
NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS (1999), which discusses how the state uses rhetoric to
shape public perceptions of juvenile crime and gun control); Daniel M. Filler,
Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 346-64
(2001) (examining the use of child-victim stories and statistics to generate support
for Megan’s Law).
299. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 373 (1993) (noting
“a tilt by the Rehnquist Court in favor of protection of property rights and away from
the strong preference given to personal rights by the Warren and Burger Courts”).
300. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, at 244-45 (discussing Robert Westley’s proposal of
establishing a private trust, which would “be funded out of the general revenues of
the United States to support programs” that further the education and economic
empowerment of Blacks); see also Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of AfricanAmerican Reparations to Redirect America’s Future, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2002)
(arguing that reparations should augment existing programs by supporting
institutions in Black communities, Black-owned businesses, and affirmative action
programs).
301. See, e.g., Chisolm, supra note 5, at 721-22 (noting that since not all Blacks are
descendant of slaves, an appropriate strategy is to treat Blacks, as a class, like an
injured party, and then create subclasses to determine eligibility for specific
remedies).
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eschewed making concrete suggestions and asked for further study of
302
the matter.
Just compensation for slavery takings could probably be designed
in a similar manner to trust funds proposed by reparations advocates.
In addition, just compensation could be designed based on any
findings of committees set up to study the issue. Fluid compensation,
303
or cy pres compensation models, could be used based on theories
304
developed in numerous mass tort cases. Some portion of any award
305
could go to organizations, as was done in the Holocaust cases and
306
the Agent Orange case.
It is also possible that other valid
approaches exist. The problem is certainly complex, as is distribution
302. See Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act,
H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill states:
(b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to establish a commission to—
(1) examine the institution of slavery which existed from 1619 through 1865
within the United States and the colonies that became the United States,
including the extent to which the Federal and State Governments
constitutionally and statutorily supported the institution of slavery;
(2) examine de jure and de facto discrimination against freed slaves and
their descendants from the end of the Civil War to the present, including
economic, political, and social discrimination;
(3) examine the lingering negative effects of the institution of slavery and
the discrimination described in paragraph (2) on living African-Americans
and on society in the United States;
(4) recommend appropriate ways to educate the American public of the
Commission’s findings;
(5) recommend appropriate remedies in consideration of the Commission’s
findings on the matters described in paragraphs (1) and (2); and
(6) submit to the Congress the results of such examination, together with
such recommendations.
303. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the cy pres doctrine as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose,
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the
court will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose
which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). See generally Note, Damage
Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448 (1972)
(describing how the cy pres doctrine can be applied to class action law suits).
304. See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305
(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that “[f]ederal courts have frequently approved [cy pres
awards] in the settlement of class actions where the proof of individual claims would
be burdensome or the distribution of damages costly”).
305. See In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 140 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (granting final approval of a $1.25 billion settlement agreement after
determining that it reflected “a fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise,” even
though specific information about individual recoveries was not yet discovered).
306. See generally PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN
THE COURTS 206-23 (1987) (providing an in-depth analysis of the Agent Orange
litigation and explaining the compensation scheme crafted by the court, which
among other things, gave millions of dollars to veterans’ organizations for legal,
medical, and social services).
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307

of any compensation. As with other compensation schemes, the
logistical problems of victim identification and award distribution
308
should not prove fatal to restitution.
One compensation issue unique to takings claims is that courts
309
However, there is no
generally award market price for takings.
310
market for self-ownership, which is an inalienable good. Given this
difficulty, it is probably appropriate instead to compensate based on
311
disgorgement of unjust enrichment.
An alternative might be to base compensation on the market value
of the labor (i.e., what slaveowners would have had to pay in the
absence of slavery). That value could serve as a minimum, with a
premium added to reflect the fact that the labor was involuntary.
The calculation of appropriate compensation could use the
312
economic valuations of life as set out in economic studies.
The
307. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 297, at 971 (discussing how courts use fluid
recovery to deal with the problems of mass tort claims, such as with aggregated
settlements, compensation-administration plans, and insurance type installment
payment programs); David Chen, Defining Limit of Generosity for 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 2002, at 25 (noting the difficulties in formulating disbursement awards from
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund as well as the fact that many families
believe the awards, though potentially in excess of $20 million, do not fairly value a
person’s worth and lost income).
308. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 153, at 702 (noting that despite any
purported problems with slave reparations, the problems—and solutions—are no
different than other complex cases such as “wrongful life” cases wherein the people
bringing the claim would not exist if not for the wrongdoing).
309. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (holding
that just compensation is measured by the market value of the property at the time of
the taking, unless the market value is too difficult to find or would lead to injustice,
because market prices are easily determined and generally reliable).
310. Market price in the slavery context could arguably be established through
examining prices of slave sales.
However, that market is almost certainly
undercompensatory. Slave market prices reflect only the property’s value after the
taking. Since the value of property is adversely affected by the taking, such ex post
market valuations may undervalue the property.
The problem of properly valuing slave labor is exacerbated by the fact that, prior
to the government action allowing slavery, the market in question did not exist. The
government taking (and corollary gift to private property owners) created an entirely
new market. See generally POSNER, supra note 172, at 65 (discussing the problems that
arise when market value results from government action).
311. See Sebok, supra note 62, at 651-57 (discussing unjust enrichment in the
reparations context). The Supreme Court has stated that:
[A]n exception to the normal measure of just compensation is required
[where] fair market value is not ascertainable. Such cases, for the most part,
involve properties that are seldom, if ever, sold in the open market. Under
those circumstances, we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid,
assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the
condemned property.
50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. at 29-30 (internal quotations omitted).
312. Professor Kip Viscusi has written extensively about the economic valuation of
life. See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 697-701 (2d
ed. 1995) (stating that an implicit value of life ranges from $1 million to $6 million);
W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1912, 1930
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value in such studies for death is about $5 million to $7 million—that
313
is, people tend to value their life at about that rate. If that amount
is accepted as the value of life, then the value of self-ownership is
presumably some fraction of that amount.
In sum, though compensation would raise many issues, much of
the groundwork for distribution, including examining and discussing
various payment options, has already been set out in the reparations
literature.
One question unique to takings claims—how to
approximate market price for inalienable property—is adequately
resolved by instead using either disgorgement analysis or market
value of labor.
VI.

WHAT TAKINGS CLAIMS ADD TO THE REPARATIONS MODEL

The Takings Clause gives reparation advocates a new theory to
argue for compensation for slavery. It has both advantages and
disadvantages as compared with the traditional tort-based reparations
model.
314
A major advantage, as noted above, is that the Takings Clause
arguably is not subject to the defense of sovereign immunity. This is
especially significant because the only reparations case to date to
make it to the appellate level, Cato v. United States, foundered on
315
precisely those grounds.
Takings claims may also be less susceptible to the defenses of
attenuation, which have plagued traditional tort-based claims.
Attenuation has been a great bugbear for reparations claims. Tort
law in general is reluctant to recognize claims of harm that are
316
Tort theory has trouble explaining
attenuated rather than direct.
(1993) [hereinafter Viscusi, Value of Risks] (arguing that the value of life of a U.S.
airline passenger averages about $5 million); cf. POSNER, supra note 172, at 214-17
(discussing economic valuation of death using insurance and risk, and the drawbacks
of that method). Viscusi’s approach to valuation of life has been criticized by some
scholars. See David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O’Shea, Can Law and Economics Be Both
Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335, 395-98 (2002) (noting that the economic
analysis and decision-making that Viscusi suggests that corporations should utilize is
offensive to the public and results in higher awards being implemented by jurors
against such corporations).
313. See Viscusi, Value of Risks, supra note 312 (concluding in 1993 that the value of
life was $5 million). Adjusted for inflation, it would now be worth a little over $6
million. Id.
314. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing application of the defense of sovereign
immunity to takings claims for slavery).
315. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that,
inter alia, the plaintiff’s claims fell outside the United States’ limited waiver of
sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
316. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 2, 35-38 (discussing how courts limit defendant
liability through the use of procedures like foreseeability and proximate cause). See
generally J. Mark Appleberry, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Focus on
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how claims made many years after a crime can meet all of the
317
Tort actions seeking tort compensation for
elements of a tort.
318
claims bridging generations have not generally been successful. For
example, in the DES mass tort case, the court did not award damages
319
to granddaughters, finding that the harm was too attenuated.
In
the Holocaust cases, which also dealt with slave labor, the primary
320
concern was in dealing with the victims themselves.
Importantly,
there was not an overwhelming degree of attenuation between the
321
crime and the settlement in the Holocaust cases.
Slavery reparations claims, in contrast, bring a large degree of
attenuation—a generational gap. However, the Supreme Court
clarified that “the Takings Clause does not have ‘an expiration date’”
in its ruling allowing property owners who acquire title after the
322
enactment of a regulation to bring takings claims.
While takings claims have often been prosecuted as torts, they are
323
not solely rooted in the tort law tradition.
Since takings claims
Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 304, 314-22 (1995) (arguing that rules limiting
tort claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress create an arbitrary cutoff and
that a better rule would focus on the relationship between the parties).
317. See KEITH N. HYLTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR REPARATIONS CLAIMS 5-7 (Boston
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-05, 2003) (arguing
that because of the passage of time, tort claims for slave reparations suffers from the
problem of identifying class members and establishing causation), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdf_files/HyltonK033103.pdf (on file with
the American University Law Review); see also HYLTON, supra note 137, at 38-40
(noting the difficulty in determining the value of slave labor due to the fact that
slaves were not compensated, and discussing the trouble in figuring out what the
appropriate value would be to current generations). Jeremy Waldron has argued
that the indeterminacy of such claims weighs against their viability. Jeremy Waldron,
Superseding Historical Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 6-27 (1992); cf. HYLTON, supra note 137, at
48-50, 53-56 (suggesting that rejecting reparation claims on moral grounds, as
argued by Waldron, fails to recognize both the continuing impact of slavery on
current society, and that those who benefited from slavery should be required to pay
compensation).
318. But cf. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 153, at 700 (noting that some
reparation schemes allow payments to descendents based on the fact that when the
property was expropriated the takers knew they were injuring future generations).
319. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that,
although the effects of DES could extend for generations, the court must limit
liability to those who took the drug so that the amount of compensation would be
manageable).
320. In re Holocaust Victim Asset Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(approving settlement and distribution plan for those “recognized as targets of
systematic Nazi persecution”).
321. The settlement was approved in July, 2000, approximately six decades after
the Holocaust began. Id.
322. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001) (asserting that future
successors to property may challenge unreasonable land use limitations, or else
“postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend
any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable”).
323. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 716-17 (1999) (noting
that takings claims were brought as both torts and as quasi-contracts cause of
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originate in property, an argument can be made that they do not
require the same showing of proximate cause as traditional torts. In
addition, if theories of derivative takings or continuous takings are
approved, there is no attenuation to be raised because the injury is
current. Similarly, takings jurisprudence allows a claim to be brought
despite the fact that some slaves receive their property interest—i.e.
324
were born—after the imposition of laws removing that interest.
Takings claims on behalf of slavery victims and their descendants may
thus avoid some of the difficulties that have plagued tort-based
reparations actions.
In addition to specific legal differences, takings claims also have
the benefit of drawing from a different legal history and tradition
than tort claims and appealing to a different demographic. While
tort claims for reparation are based on harm to liberty and human
325
rights —pillars of liberal and critical thought—takings claims would
be based on a property deprivation—a pillar of libertarian thought.
This difference could impact just how compensation claims are
326
viewed in increasingly more conservative courts.
To the extent that
a Takings Clause argument can expand the base of support for
327
compensation for slavery, it serves a vital function.
Enlisting the Takings Clause to address the harm of slavery also
encourages healthy cross-pollination of legal ideas. Great benefits
could result from Takings Clause scholars and reparations scholars
working together to address the historic injustice of slavery takings.
Finally, takings claims provide another opportunity to raise these
issues in a judicial forum. Every time these claims are raised, there is
a chance they will succeed, as well as a chance that defendants will
choose to settle. Even if takings claims are as much of a long shot as
traditional tort-based reparations claims, two long shots are better
than one.
It is clear that takings claims present a unique set of difficulties.
Specifically, they require the establishment of a property right of selfactions).
324. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 (holding that a takings claim is not barred simply
because an owner took title of the property after the regulation was enacted).
325. See HYLTON, supra note 137, at 2-3 (noting that potential claims under tort law
could include “social torts” such as deprivation of status and the denial of religious
freedom).
326. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 659-75 (2003) (discussing the conservative
nature of the Rehnquist Court).
327. See Boris I. Bittker & Roy L. Brooks, The Constitutionality of Black Reparations, in
WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 3, at 374, 385 (noting that “a judicial
resolution of . . . legal questions surrounding black reparations might well turn on
public policy considerations”).
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328

ownership.
They also run against problems of possible
329
Plus, the more
constitutional endorsement, mentioned earlier.
promising takings arguments are based on new applications of
takings law, such as derivative takings, that have not yet been
approved by courts. Finally, Takings Clause claims can only be
brought against the government, not private actors.
Takings Clause arguments, then, are not a silver bullet that can
remedy every problem presented by compensation claims. Rather,
they provide an additional tool for the reparations advocate. This
tool could be fruitful, especially as legal theories are further
developed to avoid the problems associated with takings claims.
CONCLUSION
The taking of slaves’ self-ownership should be viewed as a
compensable act under the Takings Clause. The idea has intuitive
appeal—if slaves did not suffer a taking, who did? The argument also
creates a kindlier, more reasonable persona for the Takings Clause,
which unfortunately until now has only been associated with slavery
through arguments favoring compensation for slaveowners.
Slavery looks in many ways like a prima facie taking. Unique
problems certainly exist in takings analysis, when applied to slavery.
However, impetus for overcoming these problems can be found in
the strong parallels to the purposes of the Takings Clause and the
policy behind reparations. The argument that slavery violated the
Takings Clause violation can be employed before courts and
legislatures to expand the debate on reparations, and to help attain
just compensation for millions of takings victims.

328. Supra Part I.
329. Supra Part IV.B.

